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INTRODUCTION
The cost of higher education has been rising faster than inflation for decades
and is likely to continue to do so despite reform efforts.1 This has negative
distributional consequences given that higher education is a quasi-public good
that should be consumed widely. As the costs continue to rise, higher education
will become increasingly unaffordable to those at the lower end of the income
distribution, even though as a matter of justice and economic policy, higher
education ought to be available to all. Full public financing of higher education
would be an obvious answer to this distributional problem, but the cost renders
that close to politically impossible.
But, the federal government has, to a first approximation, already created a
system of full public financing of higher education paid for with progressive
taxation: income-driven repayment student loan programs, such as Income-
Based Repayment (IBR) and Pay As You Earn (PAYE). In 2010, the federal
government essentially took over the student loan industry,2 and as of 2012,
federal Direct Loan and Grad PLUS Loan3 borrowers may choose to pay no
more than 10% of their discretionary income to service those loans, with
forgiveness of any remaining debt after a maximum of twenty years for any new
borrower regardless of degree, career, or debt load.4 Thus, higher-education
1. See infra Part I.B.
2. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
3. These are the primary student loan products offered by the federal government. PAYE, IBR, and
the other income-driven repayment programs are opt-in programs available to any new borrower of
these loans. See infra Part III.A.
4. Graduates in public service careers can have their debt forgiven after ten years. See infra note
141. The older Income-Contingent Repayment program provides for forgiveness after twenty-five
years, see infra note 126 and text accompanying notes 126–27, though that program is obsolete for new
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tuition is paid by the government and funded with something that looks much
like a 10% tax on income, though this scheme is almost entirely separate from
the nominal “spending” and “taxing” categories, respectively.
Should income-driven repayment become widely adopted,5 higher-education
costs will ultimately be paid by former students partly as a function of their
income, with any remaining costs borne by taxpayers generally. But the pay-
ments from the government would be treated as loans, and payments to the
government would be treated as payments of loan principal and interest. Thus,
the spending will remain largely off budget.6 Despite these optics, tuition will
be paid out of what is essentially progressively raised tax revenue.7
This model for provision of a public or quasi-public good differs from the
classic allocative model—simply paying for the good out of general revenue—
and may offer a compelling approach for large-scale public good provision in an
era of rising costs and tightening budgets. In this model, what is in effect
redistributive public spending funded with progressive taxation is structured as
individual expenditures to private entities, guided by subsidies, smaller taxes,
and regulation. I refer to this as “quasi-public spending,” and I suggest here
(and develop more fully in other writing) that quasi-public spending may in
some cases be both more economically efficient and more politically palatable
than traditional spending.8
Leaving aside for a moment the structure of collective spending, why is
higher education9 a worthy subject of government intervention at all? Because
higher education is a “quasi-public good”10 and thus suitable for collective
spending. The substantial positive externalities from higher education make
widespread provision of the good an issue of public concern. Higher education
borrowers. New rules extend the repayment period to twenty-five years for students with graduate-
school debt. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
5. As of this writing, only 17% of federal student loans are in an income-driven repayment program,
though enrollments are accelerating. See Federal Student Aid, Direct Loan Portfolio by Repayment
Plan, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/DLP
ortfoliobyRepaymentPlan.xls (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
6. The only budget item is the present value of the amount by which outlays exceed revenues over
the lifetime of the loan; thus, the budget reflects only the cost of forgiveness, not the full nominal
amount of the loan. See infra Part III.B.
7. That some students may opt out by simply paying cash is an important complication to this view,
which I address in Part IV.A.2.
8. See infra Part IV.A.3; John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming June
2016) (on file with author).
9. As used in this Article, “higher education” refers not just to traditional four-year college and
university programs but also to any sort of post-secondary education, including community colleges,
associate degree programs, and vocational and professional training.
10. See, e.g., CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND
POLICIES 73 (17th ed. 2008) (“[Q]uasi-public goods . . . could all be priced and provided by private firms
through the market system. But . . . because they all have substantial positive externalities, they would
be underproduced by the market system. Therefore, government often provides them to avoid the
underallocation of resources that would otherwise occur.”). Quasi-public goods are distinguishable
from true public goods because they are not strictly nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, which is the
classic definition of a public good. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 414 (3d ed. 1992).
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is increasingly necessary to generate the requisite skills for our technology- and
creativity-driven economy and ought also to be a tool of social mobility.
Relying only on a private market would likely lead to a suboptimal amount of
education because individuals may not internalize those positive externalities
when making the decision to purchase, and they are often liquidity constrained.
There are good reasons to think that the United States is currently underproduc-
ing high-skilled workers, and that this is one (though certainly not the only)
cause of growing income inequality.11
At the same time, the cost structure of higher education affects our ability to
expand access. Higher-education costs have been rising faster than inflation for
as long as anyone can remember.12 Reformers have suggested a number of ways
to try to rein in costs. Although some of these reforms may succeed in “bending
the cost curve,” as it were, there are good reasons to believe that we cannot
easily stop or reverse the growth in costs entirely. This is in part because of
Baumol’s cost disease, an economic phenomenon in which industries with
relatively low labor productivity—like education, health care, and services in
general—see prices rise faster than inflation, potentially putting a strain on
household budgets.13 Thus, without distributional reforms, we are likely to be
faced with the disturbing case of higher education being rationed only to those
with the highest ability or from the richest families, even while the demand for
skills grows. As a matter of justice and economic policy, this is precisely the
sort of situation that calls for government intervention. The costs of higher
education and the associated student-loan-debt burdens carried by former stu-
dents are large drags on economic growth, social mobility, skills generation, and
simply the well-being of vast numbers of past, current, and future students.
The current approach to this issue has been to provide upfront need-based
aid, such as Pell Grants, tax credits, and institutional financial aid, but these
have not kept up with cost growth.14 More importantly, need-based grants are a
poorly targeted way to subsidize higher education.15 They address only access
problems due to parental income and wealth, without regard for the program-
matic and distributional goals of supporting graduates entering low-wage ca-
reers. A child of schoolteachers may go on to be a schoolteacher too or a hedge
fund manager, and only one of these ought to be subsidized. Moreover, students
with high debt face a higher risk of destitution if things go badly when it is too
late for Pell Grants to help.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See, e.g., ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD & DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COLLEGE COST SO MUCH? 19–32
(2011); infra Part I.B.
13. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE: WHY COMPUTERS GET CHEAPER AND HEALTH CARE DOESN’T
(2012); see also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 88 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
2014); W. J. Baumol & W. G. Bowen, On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their Economic
Problems, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 495, 500 (1965); infra text accompanying notes 52–55.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 93–107.
15. See infra Part IV.A.
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Income-driven repayment programs such as PAYE,16 by contrast, make the
judgment of need ex post, once a graduate is using the benefits of higher
education to earn income. Graduates with higher incomes pay back the full cost
of their educations (and possibly more), whereas those with lower income—
whether by choice or luck—do not. In this way, income-driven repayment is not
so different from our main tax system; we all receive benefits of government,
but the costs are paid for in a progressive way.
Of course, as this Article will discuss, the actual PAYE program differs from
that simple approximation in important ways. But framing income-driven repay-
ment as, in part, a tax on income to pay for higher education forces us to ask
whether higher education ought to be publicly and progressively financed,
whether PAYE is the way to do it, and whether there are potential reforms to
PAYE to make it operate better. Based on that analysis, this Article makes
several policy recommendations designed to increase the effectiveness and
equity of PAYE, including requiring a discount on tuition paid with PAYE-
eligible Direct Loans, lifting the limits on undergraduate borrowing, raising the
statutory loan interest rate, and shifting funding from Pell Grants toward PAYE.
These last two recommendations are perhaps counterintuitive and deserve a
bit more of a preview. First, under PAYE, the only borrowers who actually pay
the full interest amount are those with relatively high incomes; all others pay
only 10% of discretionary income,17 with limited interest accrual and capitaliza-
tion. Thus, a higher interest payment can act as a tool of redistribution, and we
need not worry about struggling graduates with high interest payments. Second,
by focusing on postgraduation income, rather than prematriculation parental
income and wealth,18 PAYE is more targeted to both the programmatic and
distributional goals of the program. The availability of federal loans removes ex
ante financial barriers to attendance, and graduates who earn high incomes have
no need ex post.
16. Terminology is a challenge with this Article because there are several different programs
available, and they continue to evolve. Because “Pay As You Earn” is the latest version, and the version
that the administration is proposing extending to more borrowers, I typically use “PAYE” to refer to the
current program, though the administration has recently instituted a Revised Pay As You Earn plan
(REPAYE). See infra note 134. When relevant, I will distinguish PAYE from the earlier “Income-Based
Repayment” and “Income-Contingent Repayment” programs. Following the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion’s terminology, I also use “income-driven repayment” as a general term to describe the category of
loan in which payments are a function of income.
17. “Discretionary income” is Adjusted Gross Income minus 150% of the relevant poverty line. See
infra note 136 and accompanying text. Thus, a borrower must be earning at least 150% of the poverty
line before any payment is owed on a loan.
18. Pell Grants are calculated based in part on student and parental income and assets. See infra note
94.
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Although this Article concludes that income-driven repayment is both theoreti-
cally supported and an improvement over our current system, its success is not
free from doubt—far from it. Adverse selection problems—particularly from
students from wealthy families and those entering high-income fields—and
moral hazard problems—particularly from the schools themselves—have the
potential to undermine the program. Thus, regulation and monitoring must play
an important role.
This Article makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it is, to my
knowledge, the first article in the legal literature to systematically analyze this
huge new entitlement benefit that will affect millions of people and hundreds of
billions of dollars. Second, in framing income-driven repayment as a tax
instrument, this Article shows that PAYE should be viewed as an integrated part
of the public finance system, not merely as a loan program. This framework
then provides the basis for a novel analysis of the effectiveness, equity, and
economic efficiency of the program, and for several new policy recommenda-
tions to make PAYE more effective and equitable.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents an argument for why public,
collective spending on higher education is necessary and likely unavoidable.
Part II briefly reviews the evolution of higher-education finance, focusing on the
shift from government and charitable funding toward tuition- and loan-based
funding. Part III explains the operation of the PAYE program and then frames it
not as a loan-forgiveness program, but rather as a tax-and-transfer program. Part
IV presents an argument for why income-driven repayment may be an appropri-
ate method for public funding of higher education by focusing on the goals of
increasing higher education while distributing the costs equitably and effi-
ciently. Based on these insights, Part IV also recommends specific changes to
improve the PAYE program and better manage its risks.
I. THE INCREASING NECESSITY—AND COST—OF HIGHER EDUCATION
As this Article will discuss, PAYE is, in essence, a public financing program
for higher-education tuition with a somewhat progressive form of cost-sharing.
But a prior question is whether such an intervention is justified. In this Part, I
review the economics literature to explain briefly why higher education is both
necessary (in section A) and expensive (in section B), thus making the distribu-
tion of its costs a particular issue of public importance. There are, of course,
many arguments for the general importance of higher education;19 here I focus
particularly on economic and distributional issues that are relevant to the
19. For example, higher education can increase democratic and community participation, egalitarian
attitudes, mental and physical health, and parenting and family-planning choices. See, e.g., JOHN
BYNNER & MURIEL EGERTON, INST. EDUC., UNIV. LONDON, THE WIDER BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
(2001), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100202100434/http://www.hefce.ac.uk/
pubs/hefce/2001/01_46.htm.
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question of public financing. In section C, I turn to the question of whether
technological and other changes could bring down higher-education costs.
A. THE NEED FOR KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS
Although arguments for higher education abound, here I focus on three: the
ever-rising quantity of knowledge and skills, the demand for that knowledge
and those skills in the economy, and the connection between higher education
and social mobility.
First, the volume of knowledge is constantly increasing; thus, we should
expect the volume of schooling to also increase.20 Each year there is more
scientific knowledge to teach, more history, more technology, more literature,
more ways of doing business, more trades, and more law. The content mix can
shift to reflect changes in knowledge, of course. For example, when Harvard
was founded, the curriculum was largely theology, Latin, and Greek,21 and
calculus had not yet been invented.22 But to a significant degree, knowledge and
skills are cumulative. Today’s nurse needs to understand not only basic anatomy
but also how to operate diagnostic technology, how to manage insurance
coding, and how to dispense an ever-increasing number of drugs. A primary
school teacher is responsible not only for reading, writing, and arithmetic, but
also pedagogical theory, problem solving, technological literacy, and manage-
ment of psychological and behavioral disorders, as well as navigating complex
regulations, like No Child Left Behind. A marketer has to understand the
technology behind online advertising and analyze huge databases of market
research and usage data. An automobile mechanic must understand increasingly
complex technology, including both diagnostic tools and the cars themselves.
And so on. The world is only getting more complex and technologically
sophisticated, and educational requirements must grow along with that.
The public has a stake in expanding higher education because of the social
benefits from an educated workforce and population, whether measured in terms
20. See William F. Massy & Andrea K. Wilger, Productivity in Postsecondary Education: A New
Approach, 14 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 361, 366 (1992) (discussing the “growth force” as a
companion to the cost disease, whereby “[n]ew knowledge leads to the need for greater technol-
ogy, new classes, and even new disciplines. Yet old knowledge remains relevant”); see also
ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 80–81 (discussing Massy & Wilger’s “growth
force”).
21. See J. Anthony Lukas, 80 Years of Curriculum Changes Produces Extensive Study Areas, HARV.
CRIMSON (Jan. 8, 1953), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1953/1/8/80-years-of-curriculum-changes-
produces.
22. Although elements of what came to be known as calculus go back to ancient times, the
cocreators of calculus are generally agreed to be Isaac Newton, who published his Principia Math-
ematica in 1687, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who developed his theories beginning in the 1670s
and published in 1684. See A. RUPERT HALL, PHILOSOPHERS AT WAR: THE QUARREL BETWEEN NEWTON AND
LEIBNIZ (1980). Harvard University was founded in 1636. History, HARVARD, http://www.harvard.edu/
about-harvard/harvard-glance/history (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
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of wages for all workers,23 economic growth,24 or just overall well-being.25
Education is a primary example in the economics literature of a “quasi-public
good”—a good that, although not strictly speaking a nonrivalrous, nonexclud-
able classic public good, still has such substantial positive externalities and
spillover effects as to be within government’s purview.26 There is a broad social
consensus that K–12 education should be universal and publicly funded, for
example, and as human knowledge expands beyond the capacity of primary and
secondary education, the same argument could apply to higher education.
Second, there is a deep relationship between educational attainment and
income inequality27 due to skill-biased technological change.28 That is, the most
highly valued skills today tend to be those involved with manipulating more
advanced technologies, such as computer programming and industrial engineer-
ing. Old-line factory jobs increasingly require more advanced technical skills,
such as the ability to operate a computer numerical control (CNC) machine.29
23. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Angrist, How Large Are the Social Returns to Education?
Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7444, 1999) (finding, using ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates, that a one-year increase in average
schooling rates correlates with a 7% increase in average wages); Enrico Moretti, Social Returns to
Education and Human Capital Externalities: Evidence from Cities 4 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. for
Labor Econ., Working Paper No. 9, 1998) (finding that a 1% increase in the share of workers with
college degrees increase the wages of high school dropouts by 2.2%, high school graduates by 1.3%,
and those with some college by 1.2%). But see Acemoglu & Angrist, supra, at 16–17 (finding almost no
social returns when using an instrumental variables approach rather than OLS).
24. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5698, 1996); Andrea Bassanini & Stefano
Scarpetta, Does Human Capital Matter for Growth in OECD Countries? Evidence from Pooled
Mean-Group Estimates 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 282, 2001) (finding
that one additional year of schooling leads to a 6% increase in overall output).
25. See, e.g., BYNNER & EGERTON, supra note 19, at 39; Adriana Lleras-Muney, The Relationship
Between Education and Adult Mortality in the United States, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 189 (2005) (finding a
causal relationship between education levels and adult mortality levels).
26. See supra note 10.
27. On data showing increases in income inequality, see, for example, CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE
F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 47–49 figs.2.1, 2.2 & 2.3 (2008); PIKETTY,
supra note 13, at 291–96; Stephen B. Cohen, Inequality and the Deficit, 132 TAX NOTES 273, 273–80
(2011) (summarizing research).
28. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 56–60; GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at
89–125. To be clear, this is not the only explanation. Other factors include globalization forces, both by
increasing the earnings of those with high skills and by increasing the supply of low-skilled workers
through outsourcing and immigration; the decline of unions; the erosion of the federal minimum wage;
and new tax- and accounting-driven executive compensation arrangements. See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra
note 27, at 90. A particularly prominent alternative explanation is the growth in capital income (and the
income of managers of capital) relative to labor income, given the extreme concentration of capital
ownership. See PIKETTY, supra note 13, at 25–27. Piketty questions whether the Goldin & Katz thesis
can adequately explain observed features of income inequality in the U.S. Id. at 314–15. However,
Piketty’s focus is particularly on the top 1% of incomes, rather than more moderately high earners, and
he acknowledges that the Goldin & Katz thesis likely does partly explain the more general wage
premium for college graduates. Id. The skyrocketing incomes and wealth of the top 1% (or even the top
0.1%) likely have a different cause, but that is not crucial for the argument in this Article.
29. See Tom Ashbrook, The New Blue Collar Jobs of Tomorrow, On Point, WBUR (Oct. 14, 2014,
10:00 AM), http://onpoint.wbur.org/2014/10/14/blue-collar-jobs-unemployment-rate. CNC machines
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Even jobs that one might consider low-tech, like law or fashion design, have
increasingly large technological components (consider Westlaw or computer-
aided design, respectively) and compete for talented people who could choose
different professions.30 Thus, high-skilled workers are in high demand by
businesses.
In recent decades, however, the supply of high-skilled workers has not kept
up with demand, and this is likely a source of income inequality.31 For most of
the twentieth century, supply largely kept up with demand, which helped to
keep inequality in check; there was no need to pay a large premium for skills if
there were plenty of people with such skills.32 In earlier periods, the demand for
skills was met through increasing high school graduation rates and female
labor-force participation;33 today we must look to higher education. Our educa-
tion system has not been producing enough skilled workers to meet demand,
and this drives up the premium for skills, and in turn, income inequality.34
According to the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Work-
force, getting a bachelor’s degree adds a median of $1 million to lifetime
earnings, and even just attending college can add as much as $250,000.35
Furthermore, the unemployment rate for those with a bachelor’s degree or
higher is less than half the rate for those with only a high-school degree36—
another sign of high demand for skills.
are used in milling or machining manufacturing components that require highly precise and accurate
specifications, such as parts for computers or medical devices. See Numerical Control, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numerical_control (last modified Oct. 29, 2015). Some postsecondary
school is required for CNC machine operators. See, e.g., MaryJo Webster, Where the Jobs Are: The New
Blue Collar, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/30/job-economy-middle-
skill-growth-wage-blue-collar/14797413 (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
30. If an industry is competing with technology-driven industries for skilled workers, then it will
have to pay similar wages to attract workers who could alternatively make more money in a
technology-driven field. This is a subset of the larger cost disease story told infra Part I.B.
31. See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 91–95; see also id. at 293–96 (presenting a model for
predicting wage differentials based on fluctuations in both supply and demand for skilled workers).
32. See id. at 296–304 (arguing that the college wage premium is driven mostly by changes in
relative supply of college-educated workers, rather than in relative employer demand for skills).
33. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 59–60; GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 164, 168.
34. See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 291. This process also feeds back on itself and on the
growth of income from capital. The high incomes to those with high skills are reinvested back into the
economy in the form of capital. Id. at 40. This changes the capital-to-labor ratio in the economy,
increasing capital’s share, and the concentration of capital is another significant driver of income
inequality. See PIKETTY, supra note 13, at 220–22. Furthermore, the investment in capital likely also has
an indirect effect on labor productivity and the demand for yet more skills. This potentially exacerbates
the labor income inequality caused by skill-biased technological change.
35. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, STEPHEN J. ROSE & BAN CHEAH, GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. &
WORKFORCE, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS 3–4 (2011), available at
http://cew.georgetown.edu/ report/the-college-payoff.
36. In August 2015, the unemployment rates were 2.5% and 5.4%, respectively. See Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Table A-5: Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitu-
tional Population 25 Years and Over by Educational Attainment, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB.
STAT., http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea05.htm (last modified Sept. 4, 2015).
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Third, higher education is (or ought to be) a force for social mobility by
giving more young people access to the college wage premium.37 Unfortu-
nately, the data show that there is still a significant barrier to higher education
for students from low-income families; thus, the current higher-education sys-
tem may actually be hindering, rather than promoting, social mobility. In 2013,
only 48.8% of students from families in the lowest income quintile enrolled in
college, compared with 79.5% of students from families in the top income
group.38 The gap for college completion is even larger because high-income
students are more likely to graduate.39
Arguments differ as to the source of the barrier. One possible reason is simply
that students from less privileged backgrounds may not be as prepared for
college, either academically or in terms of the institutional knowledge of how to
apply and then how to seek services once enrolled.40 Reforms to address these
problems are vital but beyond the scope of this Article. A more relevant reason
for this Article’s purposes is the cost; many prospective students balk at the cost
of tuition or the prospect of taking on large amounts of debt.41 In addition,
students who have to work during college to support themselves may be
disadvantaged, both academically and socially, and may be less likely to
37. See JULIA B. ISAACS, ISABEL V. SAWHILL & RON HASKINS, BROOKINGS INST., GETTING AHEAD OR
LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 95 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu//media/
Research/Files/Reports/2008/2/economic-mobility-sawhill/02_economic_mobility_sawhill.PDF (“Only
14 percent of the adult children without a college degree from the bottom quintile of parental income
reach the top two quintiles. By contrast, 41 percent of adult children from the bottom quintile make it to
the top two quintiles if they earn a college degree.”).
38. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 302.30. Percentage of Recent High School Completers
Enrolled in 2-year and 4-year Colleges, by Income Level: 1975 through 2013, Digest of Education
Statistics 2014, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (July 2014), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_302.
30.asp. These percentages are down from their peaks. In 2008, 56.1% of low-income high school
graduates enrolled in college, and in 2010, 83% of high-income graduates did. Id.
39. See Martha J. Bailey & Susan M. Dynarski, Inequality in Postsecondary Education, in WHITHER
OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 117, 122 fig.6.4 (Greg J.
Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011).
40. See, e.g., SUZANNE METTLER, DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM 25–26 (2014); David Leonhardt, A Case Study in Lifting College
Attendance, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/upshot/a-case-study-in-
lifting-college-attendance.html (discussing Delaware’s program to increase the number of low-income
high school students applying for college).
41. See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 349; Susan Dynarski, The Behavioral and Distributional
Implications of Aid for College, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 281 (2002) (finding that each subsidy of $1000
in tuition costs increases college attendance by four to six percentage points); Thomas J. Kane, College
Cost, Borrowing Constraints and the Timing of College Entry, 22 E. ECON. J. 181 (1996) (finding that
college entry by lower income students was delayed in states with higher tuition costs, in part due to
borrowing constraints); Christopher Avery et al., Cost Should Be No Barrier: An Evaluation of the First
Year of Harvard’s Financial Aid Initiative 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12029, 2006) (finding that Harvard had significantly more applicants from low-income backgrounds
after instituting a policy of zero cost for families making less than $40,000, and lower costs for families
making $40,000–$65,000, see infra text accompanying notes 104–05).
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graduate.42 In summary, higher education can lead to greater skills and knowl-
edge, lower income inequality, and greater social mobility, each of which our
society needs badly.
B. THE COST OF HIGHER EDUCATION
At the same time that higher education has become increasingly necessary, it
has also become increasingly expensive, with tuition and fees growing between
two and five percentage points above inflation for decades.43 Average four-year
college tuition, fees, room, and board in 2013 ranged from around $17,500 for
in-state public universities to $35,000 for private universities,44 and tuition and
fees alone can be $50,000 or more for top-tier private colleges and universi-
ties.45 Tuition for graduate and professional schools can top $66,000.46 Tuition
is, of course, merely a list price subject to discounting, but higher-education
costs have grown at a similar rate, and those costs should also include, for
example, increased cost of living and technology and book requirements.47
Because of that, higher education takes up an increasing percentage of house-
hold budgets.48
42. See METTLER, supra note 40, at 13; Ralph Stinebrickner & Todd R. Stinebrickner, Working
During School and Academic Performance, 21 J. LAB. ECON. 473 (2003) (finding evidence that
increased employment during college decreases academic performance).
43. COLL. BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 16 fig.5 (2014), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/
sites/default/files/2014-trends-college-pricing-final-web.pdf.
44. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 330.20. Average Undergraduate Tuition and Fees and Room
and Board Rates Charged for Full-time Students in Degree-granting Postsecondary Institutions, by
Control and Level of Institution and State or Jurisdiction: 2012-13 and 2013-14, Digest of Education
Statistics, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Mar. 2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_330.20.
asp. The comparable number for public universities 1964–1965 was $1,051, or about $8,000 in 2013
dollars—meaning that the real inflation-adjusted price has more than doubled. See NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 317 tbl.306 (1995), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs95/95029.pdf.
45. The average tuition and fees of the top ten most expensive schools 2014–2015 was $49,243.
Susannah Snider, 10 Most, Least Pricey Private Colleges and Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 9, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://t.usnews.com/Z2wapn (last visited Aug. 2, 2015). Columbia University
charged $51,008. Id.
46. Harvard Business School tuition and fees totaled $66,348 for 2014–2015. Susannah Snider, 10
Most Expensive Private Business Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 19, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/the-short-list-grad-school/articles/2014/08/
19/10-most-expensive-private-business-schools.
47. Table 2.4.4: Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product, National
Data, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTableHtml.cfm?reqid9&step3&isuri1&
90369 (last revised Aug. 6, 2015) (showing the nominal costs, including both personal expenditures
and government spending); ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 83 fig.61. Student tuition net of
grants and aid has grown somewhat less than costs and list prices but has still tended to rise faster than
inflation. See COLL. BD., supra note 43, at 23 fig.12 (showing student increases in net tuition, fees,
room, and board for public four-year institutions). The net tuition, fees, room, and board amounts for
public two-year and private four-year institutions actually fell for 2007–2008 and 2010–2011, but in
both cases have started to rise again. See id. at 22, 24.
48. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 194 tbl.12.2.
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There are a number of possible explanations for the cost growth, including
the addition of amenities and services provided by schools,49 lack of price
sensitivity by students when paying with debt and aid,50 and university adminis-
tration.51 But a particularly important driver of cost growth is an economic
phenomenon known as Baumol’s cost disease.
The cost disease claims that wage growth in high-productivity industries such
as manufacturing also puts upward pressure on wages economy-wide, including
in low-productivity service industries such as education. But because output per
worker in service industries rises only slowly or not at all, prices instead have to
rise to pay those higher wages. A professor cannot grade exams or give lectures
appreciably faster today than in 1900.52 But should a university therefore freeze
professors’ real wages, it would after some time find its professors lured away
by, say, Apple or Google, where output per worker is increasing.53 In order for
professors’ salaries to grow in real terms, education prices have to grow faster
than inflation, and over time total higher-education spending becomes a greater
percentage of household budgets and overall GDP.54 Other high-labor, low-
productivity growth industries, such as health care and legal services, have also
49. See, e.g., METTLER, supra note 40, at 9; RICHARD VEDDER, GOING BROKE BY DEGREE: WHY COLLEGE
COSTS TOO MUCH 44 (2004). But see discussion infra Part I.C (regarding the changing nature of “higher
education” as a bundle of goods).
50. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 201–06 (citing William J. Bennett, Our Greedy
Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/18/opinion/our-greedy-colleges.
html) (discussing the “Bennett Hypothesis” that colleges just soak up federal financial aid by charging
higher tuition); VEDDER, supra note 49, at 20–21, 26; WILLIAM ZUMETA ET AL., FINANCING AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 24 (2012) (discussing the “revenue theory of costs,”
whereby “institutions will find ways to spend whatever revenues they can acquire in the pursuit of such
value-driven goals as educational quality”); David O. Lucca, Taylor Nadauld & Karen Shen, Credit
Supply and the Rise in College Tuition: Evidence from the Expansion of Federal Student Aid Programs
26, 40 tbl.7 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 733, 2015) (finding that as much as 65% of
the value of student loans are passed through to schools as higher tuition); Richard Vedder & Matthew
Denhart, Why Does College Cost So Much?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/02/opinion/vedder-
college-costs/index.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2011, 9:22 AM) (“When some [sic] else is paying a lot of
the bills, students are less sensitive to the price, thus allowing the colleges to care less about keeping
prices under control.”). Although the power of this effect on current tuition levels is disputed, whatever
effect there has been will likely be larger under an income-driven repayment program because students
may be even less sensitive to price. I discuss this issue and propose a solution in Part IV.C.3.
51. See VEDDER, supra note 49, at 44.
52. There are, though, some productivity improvements in higher education through the use of
technology. I return to these issues in more detail in Part I.C.
53. For the sake of argument, I am abstracting away from some of the particulars of the academic
job market, such as the glut of Ph.D.’s, which would suggest that there is perhaps enough supply of
labor that wage growth would be limited. But the market is complex; different fields have different
supply-and-demand dynamics, and it may be that the number of effective teachers and researchers is
much smaller than simply the number of Ph.D.’s. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & JULIE ANN SOSA,
PROSPECTS FOR FACULTY IN THE ARTS AND SCIENCES: A STUDY OF FACTORS AFFECTING DEMAND AND SUPPLY,
1987 to 2012 (1989). Furthermore, real wages for professors have risen over the long term.
54. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 193–95 (showing that percentage of household
income going to higher education has generally increased over time); BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 26.
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seen similar growth in real prices.55
Another way to think of the cost disease is as essentially an accounting
identity. If inflation is the weighted average price growth in a bundle of goods
and services, and the prices for some of those goods and services are rising
slower than inflation or actually dropping, then by definition, others must be
rising faster than inflation no matter what the actual rate of inflation.56 Of
course, this does not mean that education must be one of those fast-rising
services, but it is telling that, descriptively, “the list of those items whose real
costs are rising remains roughly constant, decade after decade, while the same
appears to be true of those items whose real costs are falling.”57 The cost
disease story helps to explain why.
That said, one need not fully accept the cost-disease argument to believe that
some intervention in higher education is necessary. Higher-education costs are
rising faster than inflation, and that alone demands a response.
How this cost growth affects most households is a complicated question,
however. An important yet less understood corollary to the cost disease is that
an economy can still afford the goods and services subject to the cost disease
because other goods and services are getting cheaper at the same time.58 The
allocation of money might shift away from manufactured goods and toward
services, but the overall bundle of goods need not change. The money we save
on cheaper cars, toasters, and food can go toward more expensive education and
health care. And indeed there is evidence that, despite the high growth in
higher-education prices, wage growth may more than compensate for it for the
average worker.59 As a result, one cannot simply say that higher education is
becoming more unaffordable for everyone.
That said, we are not all average, and there are clear distributional differences
in who attends college.60 Whereas the average worker may still have plenty left
over for other goods and services, those in the lower-income groups likely
would not, even after accounting for financial aid grants and other subsi-
55. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 20–27; BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 6–7 figs.1.1 &
1.2 (on medicine); id. at 28–29 fig.2.1 (on legal services). This includes a notable period of flat growth
in the 1970s, which coincided with a period of flat labor productivity growth in manufacturing. See
ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 85–86.
56. See BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 19 (“The rate of inflation, then, is an average of the rates of
growth of many different prices. It follows immediately and unequivocally that if the prices of all
commodities are not rising at the same pace, then some must be increasing at a rate above average.”).
57. Id.; see William J. Baumol, Health Care, Education and the Cost Disease: A Looming Crisis for
Public Choice, 77 PUB. CHOICE 17, 20 (1993) (“[W]hat is surprising is that those services [including
higher education] whose productivity grows slowly today are the same ones whose productivity grew
slowly as far back as there are data available.” (emphasis omitted)).
58. See BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 43–58.
59. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 193–95 (showing that most households have more
money available for purchases even after accounting for higher-education costs because wages have
more than kept up with higher education on average).
60. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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dies.61 Thus, with respect to individual students and families, the affordability
question is ultimately about cost sharing. Even if an economy as a whole can
pay the rising costs of higher education, if too much of that cost is put onto
individual students, lower-income individuals may be shut out and overall
levels of education could stagnate or drop. This puts the policy focus on
tuition—the student’s share of overall costs—which Part II addresses.
C. TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS AND ONLINE EDUCATION
Before moving on to the question of cost sharing, it is worth a brief
discussion of some of the technological improvements in higher education that
have developed and new ones developing at the time of this writing. The main
reason for low labor productivity growth in higher education is that a professor
can teach only so many students. If students are the output, a professor likely
produces close to the same output today as a century ago.62
That said, there are technological and other changes to higher education.
First, there have been technological improvements to productivity, such as word
processing and online research. But the cost disease does not require no
productivity growth, only slow productivity growth.63
Second, the bundle of goods and services called “higher education” has itself
changed with improvements in technology and standards of living. For ex-
ample, higher education now includes sophisticated science laboratories, class-
room audiovisual equipment, wireless Internet services, expanded health care
services, academic and career counseling, fitness and wellness services, and so
on. Technological improvements do not always bring down costs; sometimes
they increase quality.64 This is productivity improvement in a sense; we get
much more for our dollar, even though we do not spend less. And the same
could be said for higher education.65
61. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 193. The Education Trust has calculated that
families in the lowest income quintile are asked to pay out of pocket 80% of annual income for public
higher education. THE REIMAGINING AID DESIGN & DELIVERY CONSORTIUM FOR HIGHER EDUC. GRANTS &
WORK-STUDY REFORM, BEYOND PELL: A NEXT-GENERATION DESIGN FOR FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID 6 fig.3
(2014), available at http://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/BeyondPell_FINAL.pdf.
62. Indeed, output may even be less, due to smaller class sizes, especially in STEM fields, which
require labs and other small classes.
63. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 39–41; BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 22.
64. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 76.
65. Other quality improvements may also lower productivity. Consider the rise in law school clinical
education. Students and law firms have rightly demanded that students graduate from law schools with
more hands-on practice skills, and clinics are the primary way for law schools to teach those skills. See
Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education,
and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 605–07 (2010); Michelle Weyenberg, Top Schools of
Clinics, NAT’L JURIST, Feb. 2014, at 20–21. But clinics are also expensive and time-consuming, with a
much lower faculty-student ratio and more resources needed per student than for a traditional podium
class. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 72–73 (discussing smaller classes). But see Robert
R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014) (“[T]here is no effect on
the tuition and fees that students pay from requiring or guaranteeing every student a clinical experience
and no difference in tuition between schools that already have sufficient capacity to provide a clinical
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However, the rise of Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) and similar
online courses and lectures may provide a way to boost productivity and bring
down real costs. The number of attendees in an online lecture is not limited by
room size, and indeed some of the most popular early MOOCs have had more
than 150,000 students.66 So, in theory, a professor could teach many more
students than in a traditional classroom.
It is too early to say for sure, however, whether this will be the productivity-
enhancing technology that higher education has been lacking. First, it is not
clear that the product is the same. An online class is, at this point, a qualitatively
different experience than a traditional class, requiring not only limited interac-
tion between professor and students but also a different form of evaluation and
grading.67 Although it may turn out to educate as well or even better than a
traditional class, that has not been shown at this point. If the product is actually
of lower quality, then the inflationary forces are still in effect; paying less for a
worse product could be just as inflationary as paying more for the same
product.68 This would be a reverse of the trend described above—using technol-
ogy to decrease, rather than increase, quality.69 Indeed, some of the early
excitement for MOOCs appears to have worn off due to weak early results.70
Second, if in fact an online course is designed to have similar levels of
engagement and evaluation as a traditional course, it may not turn out to be
experience to each student and those that do not.”). The quality of the education increases, but so does
the cost.
66. See Philip G. Schrag, MOOCs and Legal Education: Valuable Innovation or Looming Disaster?,
59 VILL. L. REV. 83, 89 (2014); Laura Pappano, The Year of the MOOC, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/education/edlife/massive-open-online-courses-are-multiplying-at-
a-rapid-pace.html (reporting that over 150,000 students signed up for an Introduction to Artificial
Intelligence Course offered by Udacity, but that in a separate course focused on machine learning only
13,000 of 46,000 enrollees completed the class and earned a certificate).
67. See, e.g., Anna Ya Ni, Comparing the Effectiveness of Classroom and Online Learning: Teaching
Research Methods, 19 J. PUB. AFF. EDUC. 199, 201–04 & tbl.1 (2013).
68. This parallels the other significant cost control in higher education: the increasing use of
nontenure-track adjunct professors, likely with similarly poor results. Whether the ultimate quality-
adjusted real price increases or decreases will depend on the magnitude of each change; if costs drop by
a greater degree than quality, it may be that productivity has increased on net. See discussion of
disruption infra note 69. However, that is considering just price and not other costs, such as time and
opportunity. If a student would have to take endless free MOOCs to simulate the quality of traditional
higher education, the total cost is still high.
69. See BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 21 (noting that, in health care and education, increased
productivity often means declining quality). Note, however, that what is sometimes called “disruptive
innovation” involves using technology to develop cheaper but lower quality products for new markets,
with the innovation eventually overtaking the existing market. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN,
THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997). The theory of
disruptive innovation is not without its critics, however, particularly when applied as a general theory
relevant to all businesses and products. See, e.g., Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel
of Innovation Gets Wrong, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/
23/the-disruption-machine.
70. See METTLER, supra note 40, at 33; Tamar Lewin, After Setbacks, Online Courses Are Rethought,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/us/after-setbacks-online-courses-are-
rethought.html.
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much of a labor-saving device. Although there may be less need for tenured
professors, there will be more need for teaching assistants, discussion leaders,
graders, and so on.71 Though these individuals would likely earn lower wages,
their wages would still need to grow. Firing the extra professors may provide a
one-time boost to productivity, but after that the same cost disease trends could
take over.72 Furthermore, the professors left standing are likely to be talented,
which could lead to them extracting much of the benefits of the productivity
improvements for themselves.73
Third, even the most techno-utopian advocates of online education must still
see a role for the traditional university. It may be that online higher education is
best suited for teaching specific skills and for addressing more marginal stu-
dents and newer entrants to higher education, whereas the most able students
will continue to attend traditional universities.74 This segmenting of higher
education raises important issues of distributive justice,75 which are mostly
beyond this Article. But at whatever size the traditional university system settles
out, it will remain an expensive one and thus potentially off-limits to poorer
students regardless of ability or potential, absent public intervention.76
All that being said, if MOOCs and other online educational programs are
successful in providing high-quality higher education at a dramatically reduced
cost, then we will have at least partly solved the cost and distributional
problems, making government intervention less necessary.
II. TUITION AND STUDENT LOANS
The previous Part discussed not only the need for higher education but also
the cost of higher education and the role of cost disease forces in causing the
71. See Schrag, supra note 66, at 99–102 (noting the need for essay readers and exam proctors and
graders).
72. A similar argument applies to the calls to lower the costs of law school by removing the third
year of a J.D. program. Even in the unlikely scenario that the professoriate is cut by a third, the
remaining professors would still like competitive wages. All we will have done is made law school
somewhat cheaper for a few more years. Eventually, the cost disease would catch up again.
73. We have seen this in other “superstar” settings, such as entertainment, professional sports, and
medical and legal services. See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
845, 845 (1981); Schrag, supra note 66, at 109; see also Amanda Ripley, The $4 Million Teacher, WALL
ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324635904578639780253571520 (last updated
Aug. 3, 2013, 4:46 AM). If the best teachers are in high demand, they can extract much of the surplus for
themselves through high prices. More importantly, if they actually have the ability to substantially increase a
student’s skills, they will also be in position to extract much of the student’s anticipated bump in income.
74. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 127.
75. These issues are not new because our system of higher education already is highly segmented.
See ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 66–70; Michael N. Bastedo & Ozan Jaquette, Running in Place:
Low-Income Students and the Dynamics of Higher Education Stratification, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL’Y ANALYSIS 318 (2011); Schrag, supra note 66, at 110–11; Susan Dynarski, Rising Inequality in
Postsecondary Education, BROOKINGS (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-
mobility-memos/posts/2014/02/13-inequality-in-postsecondary-education.
76. Note that this “public intervention” could take many forms, including European-style full public
funding. In Part IV, I turn to the question of the best form for such an intervention. The only point here
is that MOOCs may not solve the problem of higher-education costs.
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growth rate to outstrip inflation. That view claims that economic forces outside
the control of any institution, or even of public policy, are one of the significant
drivers of higher-education costs. The question of how these costs are paid and
shared, however, is an institutional and public policy question. This Part briefly
discusses the evolution of higher-education finance to its current heavy reliance
on tuition and student loans.77 Section A briefly describes historical trends in
higher-education financing, whereas section B looks more closely at the role of
debt-financed tuition.
A. THE SHIFT FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE SPENDING
The higher-education finance system has always been a pastiche of govern-
ment, individual, and charitable spending, but the current period has been
marked by a decline in government support and a rise in individual tuition
payments. Government support, especially for public universities, has existed
since the early days of the republic78 but began to grow more with the Morrill
Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 189079 and hit a peak in the post-war years. The
Truman Commission Report in 1947 recommended a large expansion of higher
education, with significant support from federal and state governments.80 These
ideas were put into practice at the federal level in legislation such as the GI Bill,
the National Defense Education Act, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
and the Higher Education Act of 1965, and at the state level with, for example,
the creation of California’s three-tiered system through the Master Plan for
Higher Education of 1960,81 and with the formation and expansion of the State
University of New York System.82 Over the twentieth century, the number of
students attending college,83 and public colleges especially,84 grew dramatically.
77. For richer and more detailed accounts, see ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12; GOLDIN &
KATZ, supra note 27; ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50.
78. See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 255.
79. 7 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321 (2012); see GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 255–56; ZUMETA ET AL., supra
note 50, at 59–60.
80. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1947); see
ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 61–62.
81. CAL. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., A MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA 1960-1975
(1960), available at http://www.ucop.edu/acadinit/mastplan/MasterPlan1960.pdf.
82. See ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 64.
83. Compare GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 248 (of those born at the beginning of the twentieth
century, about 10% attended college and 5% graduated), with Table 1. Educational Attainment of the
Population 18 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 2014 (All Races), Educational
Attainment in the United States: 2014 - Detailed Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2014/tables.html (last revised Nov. 2, 2015) (of those eighteen years
old and older in 2014, 58.03% attended college and 38.61% graduated), and Table A-2. Percent of
People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin
and Sex: Selected Years 1940 to 2014, CPS Historical Time Series Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/historical/index.html (last revised Nov. 2, 2015)
(of those twenty-five years old and older in 2014, 32.00% completed four or more years of college).
84. At the beginning of the twentieth century, about one in five college students attended a public
university. See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 27, at 266. In 2000, about two in three did. See id. This
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But in the 1970s, direct government support stared to wane and tuition began
to play a larger role, a trend that has continued to the present day. There are
several reasons for this. First, the real cost of higher education began its
acceleration in the 1960s. Though it paused briefly during the stagflation years
of the 1970s,85 when there was little labor productivity growth, the strain on
state and institutional budgets was starting to show. By the early 1970s, many
institutions were already showing signs of financial trouble.86
Second, after almost twenty years without a recession, the recession caused
by the oil shock of 1973 was the beginning of our more recent boom-and-bust
business cycle, with recessions generally occurring every ten years or less. At
the same time, changes in the tax base left states with more revenue volatility
and less ability to absorb the effects of economic downturns.87 State higher-
education budgets have often been the first to be cut in a downturn because the
benefits are perceived, perhaps rightly, to accrue to the more well-off, and
universities have other sources of revenue to tap, namely tuition.88 The pattern
in recent decades has been for tuition hikes to accompany cuts in public funding
during a recession. After a recession, public funding increases somewhat,
though not to prerecession levels, and tuition remains high.89
Finally, starting in the 1970s, there was an explicit policy push for students
and families to share more of the overall cost.90 This reflected an understanding
that much of the benefits of higher education accrue to the students themselves,
and that generous public funding, especially for tiered state university systems,
had the potential to be regressive, because attendees at well-funded flagship
universities were disproportionately from high-income families and more likely
to have high incomes in the future. Some commentators in the 1970s and 1980s
recommended that instead of high public funding and low tuition, states and
their public universities should instead have high tuitions but high need-based
aid.91 And indeed, that has become the de facto policy at many of the best-
funded private colleges and flagship public universities.92
reflects, in part, changes in higher education overall, especially the growth in large research universi-
ties, which have tended to be public institutions, beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. See id. at 263, 265. Although there are still more private institutions than public today, see id.
at 254, the public institutions tend to be much larger, see id. at 266–67.
85. See ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 85–86.
86. See ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 67.
87. See John R. Brooks II, Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of Redistributive
Taxation, 68 TAX L. REV. 89, 120–21 (2014); David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises:
Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 759–60 (2010).
88. See ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 18.
89. See id. at 20 fig.1.8.
90. See id. at 68–70.
91. See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS INST., PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION (David W.
Breneman & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 1978).
92. See ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 68–69; see also ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at
156–65 (on the rise of tuition discounting).
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As state subsidies began to decline (and tuition to rise), the federal govern-
ment also stepped in to provide need-based aid, especially Pell Grants, which
were first introduced in 1972.93 Pell Grants are need-based, unlike direct state
subsidies, and originally covered most, if not all, tuition.94 For example, the
maximum grant in 1975–1976 was $1400,95 which was more than double the
average tuition and fees for a public four-year institution and over 78% of
average tuition, fees, room, and board.96 The rapid growth in tuition costs
eroded the value of Pell Grants over time, however, despite periodic funding
increases. Even after the maximum Pell Grant was raised by 13%, to $5350, in
2009,97 it covered only 36% of the average tuition, fees, room, and board for
public four-year institutions.98 The federal government99 also introduced signifi-
cant tax credits in 1997,100 which it expanded in 2009.101 The credits phase out
for incomes above $80,000102 and thus are directed at those with more need. Yet
they are also imperfect tools, in large part because they are only partially
93. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 131, 86 Stat. 235, 247–48 (1972)
(authorizing “basic grants” and “supplemental educational opportunity grants,” the predecessors to the
Pell Grants).
94. Roughly, Pell Grants cover the difference between the Cost of Attendance (COA) and the
Expected Family Contribution (EFC) up to a maximum that adjusts each year. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a,
1087kk (2012); Federal Student Aid, How Aid Is Calculated, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/
sa/fafsa/next-steps/how-calculated (last visited Nov. 3, 2015). The maximum grant 2015–2016 was
$5775. Federal Student Aid, Federal Pell Grants, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/
grants-scholarships/pell (last visited Nov. 3, 2015). The COA is based on the school and includes some
costs of living. The EFC is a complex formula that includes student and parental income and assets. See
20 U.S.C. § 1087oo (2012).
95. OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2012–2013 FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM
END-OF-YEAR REPORT tbl.1 (2013), available at http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2012-
13/pell-eoy-2012-13.pdf.
96. Author’s calculations based on Pell Grant data, id., and average tuition data in current dollars
from NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 541 tbl.381
(2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014015.pdf.
97. OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., supra note 95. The revenue to pay for this expansion came in
part from the repeal of the subsidies for student loans made by private lenders. See infra notes 124–25,
156.
98. See supra note 96.
99. For simplicity, this discussion ignores the role of federal research grants, even though these have
become significant sources of revenue for large research universities. For example, National Science
Foundation grants to universities in 2014 totaled over $26 billion, about the same amount as Pell
Grants. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL YEARS 2013–15,
at 11 tbl.2 (2015), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2015/nsf15324/pdf/nsf15324.pdf. On Pell
Grant funding, see infra note 180 and accompanying text.
100. The Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits were added by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-34, § 201, 111 Stat. 788, 799–806 (1997).
101. The American Opportunity Tax Credit temporarily increases the Hope Scholarship Credit for
taxable years 2008–2018. I.R.C. § 25A(i) (2012). The provision was added by the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1004(a), 123 Stat. 115, 313–14.
102. I.R.C. § 25A(i)(4); see also Rev. Proc. 2013-35, § 3.05, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. Technically, the
phase-out applies to those with “modified adjusted gross income” above $80,000. Modified adjusted




On the charitable side, many private institutions, particularly the wealthiest,
expanded the use of institutional grants to balance the growth in tuition. Most
notably, Harvard in 2004 announced that tuition would be free for students with
parental income less than $40,000,104 later increased to $65,000.105 Other rich
schools, like Yale, Stanford, and Princeton, quickly followed suit.106 Yet less
wealthy institutions are not able to be as generous and have turned many of
their grant dollars toward attracting top students to boost rankings, rather than
aiding poorer students.107
B. THE RISE OF STUDENT LOANS
As direct grants subsided, net tuition (tuition net of grants and aid) naturally
rose. This money can come from only a couple of places: either the income of
the parents (current income or past income in the form of savings) or the
student. For tuition borne by the student, some could perhaps come from current
earnings, but more often it comes from future income in the form of loan
payments. Thus, a student loan is essentially a way to have a share of higher-
education costs paid for out of a graduate’s future wages. And indeed, the
overall mix of financial aid began to shift toward loans starting in the late
1970s.108 In the 1975–1976 academic year, total federal grants were four times
the volume of federal loans, but by 1981–1982, loans became a greater share of
federal funding,109 and by 2012 the volume of federal grants was about half the
volume of federal loans.110
In the abstract, student loans are an appropriate part of the overall higher-
education funding system. As noted above, there are good equitable reasons to
ask a student to bear a large share of the costs of a college education, given the
103. Id. § 25A(i)(5). A tax credit is “refundable” if it can be used not just to lower taxes to $0, but in
fact to go into negative territory, thus causing a net transfer from the government. The neediest students
and recent graduates are unlikely to owe much in taxes; thus, a nonrefundable credit provides no
benefit, and a partially refundable credit provides only some benefit.
104. See Daniel J. Hemel, College Cuts Costs for Low-Income Families, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 1,
2004), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/3/1/college-cuts-costs-for-low-income-families.
105. See Scholarships & Grants, HARV. UNIV., http://college.harvard.edu/financial-aid/types-aid/
scholarships-grants (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
106. See, e.g., Emily Jane Fox, Stanford Offers Free Tuition for Families Making Less Than
$125,000, CNN MONEY (Apr. 3, 2015, 11:04 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/01/pf/college/stanford-
financial-aid/index.html.
107. See, e.g., Matthew Quirk, The Best Class Money Can Buy, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2005), http://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-best-class-money-can-buy/304307 (describing the rise of
specialized “enrollment management” functions at colleges and universities).
108. See ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 76–78 figs.4.1 & 4.2; see also id. at 88 (“Higher education
today is increasingly provided and sold as a private good, its purchase heavily reliant on debt
financing.”).
109. Id. at 77 fig.4.1.
110. See DAVID RADWIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2011–12 NATIONAL POSTSECONDARY
STUDENT AID STUDY (NSPAS:12): STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ESTIMATES FOR 2011–12, at 10 tbl.4 (2013),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013165.pdf.
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large private benefits.111 And allowing the student to pay that cost out of future
earnings, which are likely to be higher precisely because of the education, is
also appropriate. As shown by Gary Becker and others, investing in higher
education has consistently been one of the best forms of investment around,112
and borrowing at a reasonable rate to leverage that investment can make a lot of
sense financially.
The historical difficulty with this, however, was that private credit markets
were not willing to loan significant amounts without some security, and the only
asset many students have is their nontransferable human capital. Recognizing
this market failure, even Milton Friedman advocated government intervention
in the student loan market.113 The government responded with steps like
creating Sallie Mae in 1972,114 expanding the guaranteed loan program in the
late 1970s,115 and constraining discharge of student loans in bankruptcy (essen-
tially an additional subsidy to lenders).116
With loans in place, students were able to finance tuition out of future
earnings. Again, in the abstract, this is entirely appropriate. But as with any
leveraged investment, a student loan comes with increased exposure to risk—in
this case the risk that future labor income is too low. Although the average
graduate is still likely to earn a substantial return on the investment, more than
enough to pay the debt,117 graduates at the lower end may not. Furthermore, as
tuitions continue to rise, the degree of leverage also rises. Total outstanding
111. See supra text accompanying notes 90–92.
112. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1993); Christopher Avery & Sarah Turner, Student Loans: Do
College Students Borrow Too Much—Or Not Enough?, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 176 (2012) (“The
message is clear: expected lifetime earnings associated with a college degree have increased markedly
over time. As the investment value of a college degree rises, it is natural to think of individuals
increasing their willingness to borrow to achieve these higher returns.”); Michael Greenstone & Adam
Looney, Where Is the Best Place to Invest $102,000—in Stocks, Bonds, or a College Degree?,
BROOKINGS (June 25, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/06/25-education-greenstone-
looney (finding a 15.2% annual return on a college degree).
113. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 104 (1962) (“Whatever the reason, an imperfection
of the market has led to underinvestment in human capital. Government intervention might therefore be
rationalized on grounds both of ‘technical monopoly,’ insofar as the obstacle to the development of
such investment has been administrative costs, and of improving the operation of the market, insofar as
it has been simply market frictions and rigidities.”).
114. The Student Loan Marketing Association was created by the Education Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 133(a), 86 Stat. 235, 265–69 (1972).
115. See ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 50, at 70.
116. The first limitation on discharging of student loans appeared in the 1976 amendments to the
Higher Education Act. See Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90
Stat. 2081, 2099, 2141 (1976) (amending HEA § 439A to allow discharge only after five years or if
payment would impose undue hardship). This was later added to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. See
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978) (adding, inter alia, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)
(1978)).
117. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
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student debt was over $1.1 trillion as of 2014,118 and the average debt load for
the class of 2013 was $28,400 per borrower, though at some private, nonprofit
colleges average debt per borrower exceeds $70,000.119
Moreover, certain professions are likely to be particularly risky for borrow-
ers, such as those that require or encourage graduate degrees but which have
low or uncertain future income streams. Nursing, teaching, social work, minis-
try, journalism, academia, and the arts are particularly subject to this risk, as are
some legal and medical practices.120 Debt for graduate school can easily exceed
$100,000.121
These debt loads may not end up being that daunting for many graduates,
particularly considering the earnings premium for higher education and the long
time period over which the loans are amortized. But, of course, half of gradu-
ates will earn below-median income for their cohort, and the loan burden
disproportionately falls on early and thus lower-earning years. And the debt
loads for future students will increase as tuitions continue to increase. This has
the risk of deterring risk-averse potential students from attending college or of
deterring risk-averse graduates from joining certain careers.
Furthermore, the claim that borrowing to fund higher education is a sensible
plan depends on the loan being offered at relatively fair terms and with a fair
allocation of risk between borrower and lender. The borrower should borrow
only what is needed and at a fair risk-adjusted discount rate; otherwise, she
could end up with unaffordable loan payments, even if she landed a high-wage
job after graduation.
However, heading into the twenty-first century, these conditions seemed not
to hold. Federal subsidization of lenders led in some cases to predatory-style
lending by private student loan companies, sometimes in cahoots with univer-
sity financial aid offices.122 The outcry from that, plus the rapid rise in debt
118. Federal Student Aid, Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, Federal Student Loan Portfolio,
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/portfolio (last visited Nov. 3,
2015).
119. INST. FOR COLLEGE ACCESS & SUCCESS, STUDENT DEBT AND THE CLASS OF 2013, at 1, 7 (2014),
available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/classof2013.pdf.
120. Note that these are also professions with arguably large positive externalities.
121. Between 2011 and 2012, average graduate student debt in current dollars per borrower was
$74,710 for all programs and $110,570 for professional programs. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
supra note 44, at 647 tbl.332.10. Typical combined undergraduate and graduate debt was over $140,000
for those who graduated law school in 2012. See JASON DELISLE, NEW AMERICA, THE GRADUATE STUDENT
DEBT REVIEW: THE STATE OF GRADUATE STUDENT BORROWING 4 (2014), available at https://static.
newamerica.org/attachments/750-the-graduate-student-debt-review/GradStudentDebtReview-Delisle-
Final.pdf.
122. See, e.g., SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 73–74 (2011); Jonathan D. Glater, Offering Perks, Lenders Court
Colleges’ Favor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/education/24loans.
html?_r4 Jonathan D. Glater, U.S. Is Lax on Loans, Cuomo Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/us/26loans.html?srctp&_r0; Doug Lederman, Taming the Stu-
dent Loan ‘Wild West,’ INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 7, 2007), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/
07/loans.
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levels and fears of financial distress for graduates, led to the large—though still
not well-understood—policy change described in the next section: the creation
and expansion of Income-Based Repayment and Pay As You Earn.
III. THE INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT AND PAY AS YOU EARN PROGRAMS
This Part describes the new shift of the student loan system from one of
subsidized private lending, with payments based on typical loan terms, to public
lending, with payments based on income. Section A discusses the implementa-
tion of the IBR and PAYE programs and their current rules. Section B examines
in detail the cost estimates of the program. Section C presents the argument for
why an income-driven loan repayment program should be viewed, in part, as a
tax program.
A. CURRENT IBR AND PAYE RULES
Following reports about corruption and predatory lending by private student
loan lenders,123 the student loan industry was effectively nationalized by provi-
sions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 2010
that repealed the subsidies paid to private lenders under the Federal Family
Education Loan Program and expanded the Direct Loan program.124 Since then,
nearly all student loans have come directly from the federal government.125
Furthermore, in 2008 the government instituted the first Income-Based Repay-
ment (IBR) program,126 which allowed students to limit their loan-service
payments to 15% of discretionary income, and to have any remaining loan
balance forgiven after twenty-five years.127 In 2010, the HCERA expanded the
program and lowered the payments to 10% of discretionary income with
123. See Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to
Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 48–51 (2011)
(reviewing history of student loan scandals in 2007).
124. In particular, Title II of the HCERA ended the government subsidy for private student loans,
increased the amount of public loans available, and expanded and redefined the IBR program. See
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 2201–13, 124 Stat.
1029, 1074–81 (2010).
125. For the 2013–2014 academic year, private lenders originated only $10 billion out of $106
billion in all student loans; the federal government thus originated over 90% of all student loans
2013–2014. COLL. BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 16 fig.5 (2014), available at http://trends.collegeboard.
org/sites/default/files/2014-trends-student-aid-final-web.pdf. This percentage of private loans has gradu-
ally crept up from a low of around 7% 2010–2011, likely due to the caps on federal loans for
undergraduate education. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
126. There was also an earlier Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) option in effect since 1994. See
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4021, 107 Stat. 312, 341–54
(1993); Philip G. Schrag, The Federal Income-Contingent Repayment Option for Law Student Loans,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 764–74 (2001) (describing the history and operation of the ICR program).
127. College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 203, 121 Stat. 784, 792–95
(2007); see Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers
and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 34–41
(2007) (discussing 2008-era IBR rules).
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forgiveness after twenty years, beginning in 2014.128 However, the Obama
administration, through regulation, accelerated the implementation of the 10%
payment program to 2012,129 eased the treatment of accrued interest,130 and
redubbed it “Pay As You Earn” (PAYE).131 These programs are designed as
entitlement programs and therefore are not dependent on annual appropriations.132
The combination of the nationalization of the student loan industry and the
wide availability of IBR and PAYE programs are together a huge shift in
higher-education policy. But the administration is not done yet. In a June 2014
presidential memorandum, the White House directed the U.S. Department of
Education to find ways to extend PAYE to more borrowers and to better educate
borrowers about income-based options.133 At the time of this writing, the
Department of Education had recently finalized a new Revised Pay As You Earn
Plan (REPAYE), to take effect July 2016, which will apply to any federal Direct
Loan, not just those after 2007.134 The White House has proposed making
PAYE or REPAYE the sole income-driven program available to borrowers.135
128. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2213, 124 Stat.
1029, 1081 (2010).
129. The PAYE rules apply to anyone who received a Direct Loan after October 1, 2011, provided
that the borrower has no outstanding balance on any Direct Loan from before October 1, 2007. 34
C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(iii) (2015). Technically, this means that loans from as early as the 2007–2008
school year could apply, as long as the borrower continued to take out loans for 2011–2012. Id.
130. See infra note 139.
131. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a). Technically, PAYE was implemented by the administration using its
authority under the ICR, not IBR, provisions of the Higher Education Act. See Federal Perkins Loan
Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program,
77 Fed. Reg. 42,086, 42,099 (proposed July 17, 2013) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 674, 682, 685)
(claiming authority for PAYE rules under Section 455(d)(1)(D) of the HEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D)
(2012)). This is because the IBR provisions of the HCERA had a 2014 effective date, whereas Section
455(d)(1)(D) of the HEA was already in effect and gave relatively expansive authority for setting loan
repayment terms.
132. By “entitlement program,” I mean one where funds are automatically available each year
depending on qualifying formulas, as opposed to a discretionary program that requires Congress to
appropriate funds annually. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(a) (“There are hereby made available, in accordance
with the provisions of this part, such sums as may be necessary (1) to make loans to all eligible
students . . . .”). The funding for entitlement programs, including Social Security and Medicare, is thus
more politically stable than for discretionary programs.
133. Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79 Fed. Reg. 33,843
(June 12, 2014).
134. Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 67203, 67,204 (October 30, 2015) (to be codified at
34 C.F.R. pts. 668, 682, 685) [hereinafter REPAYE Rules]. The rules call for, inter alia, one half of the
otherwise accruing interest to be forgiven while a student is in “partial financial hardship”; for AGI to
include the income of a borrower’s spouse, even where the couple files taxes separately; and for
forgiveness after twenty-five, rather than twenty, years for borrowers with graduate-school debt. Id. at
67,204–05.
135. See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,608,
39,617 (referring to “proposed reforms” that would “establish a single income-driven repayment plan”);
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET PROPOSAL S-13, available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget15/justifications/s-loansoverview.pdf.
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Under PAYE and IBR, a student loan borrower’s monthly payments to
service the loan’s principal and interest is the lesser of 10% of the borrower’s
discretionary income136 or the default payment under the typical ten-year,
non-income-driven loan.137 If thereby some principal and interest goes unpaid,
it accumulates and adds to the loan balance, though under PAYE and REPAYE
(rather than IBR138), the amount of any interest capitalized into loan principal
cannot exceed 10% of the original principal—effectively another substantial
form of debt forgiveness.139 However, after twenty years for all
borrowers,140 and ten years for those in public service jobs,141 any remaining
loan balance is forgiven.142 To be clear, the twenty-year forgiveness (as opposed
to the ten-year public service forgiveness) is not dependent on the nature of the
job, or on any degree of financial hardship, other than that the borrower’s
discretionary income did not allow full payment during the term of the loan.
As of this writing, the forgiveness itself can create taxable income from the
discharge of indebtedness. In general, the cancellation of a debt provides a
benefit to a taxpayer by erasing a liability, as if a third party had simply given
136. Discretionary income is adjusted gross income (AGI) less 150% of the relevant poverty line. 34
C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(v). “Discretionary income” is actually a defined term only under the Income-
Contingent Repayment loan program (as distinct from both the IBR and PAYE programs). See id.
§ 685.209(b)(1)(iii)(A). But both IBR and PAYE use the same calculation to determine “partial
financial hardship.” Thus, for clarity I use “discretionary income” throughout to describe the difference
between a borrower’s AGI and 150% of the relevant poverty line, regardless of the program.
137. Id. § 685.209(a)(2)(i), (a)(4)(i). Under REPAYE, there is no cap; thus, all borrowers in
REPAYE will pay 10% of their discretionary income, unless they opt to leave the program. REPAYE
Rules, supra note 134, at 67,213–14.
138. This difference between IBR and PAYE in the treatment of interest has sometimes been missed
in commentary on the plans. See, e.g., LAUREN ASHER ET AL., THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS,
SHOULD ALL STUDENT LOAN PAYMENTS BE INCOME-DRIVEN? 20 (2014), available at http://ticas.org/sites/
default/files/pub_files/TICAS_IDR_White_Paper.pdf (“For example, under . . . IBR[] and PAYE, un-
paid accrued interest capitalizes when borrowers no longer qualify to make income-based payments due
to increases in income or decreases in family size.”).
139. For both IBR and PAYE, there is no charge for unpaid accrued interest for the first three years
for Direct Subsidized loans or the subsidized portion of a Direct Consolidation loan (though not for
Direct Unsubsidized loans). 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.209(a)(2)(iii), 685.221(b)(3). For non-PAYE IBR,
accrued interest is not capitalized while the borrower has a “partial financial hardship” (that is, the
standard ten-year loan payment exceeds 10% of discretionary income), but accrued interest becomes
fully capitalized once the borrower ceases to have a “partial financial hardship.” Id. § 685.221(b)(4);
see Schrag, supra note 127, at 35. For PAYE, by contrast, even if the borrower ceases to have a partial
financial hardship, the amount of capitalized interest cannot exceed 10% of the original principal
balance of the loan, though additional interest will still accrue once the borrower has left the PAYE
payment plan. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(iv). Under the new REPAYE rules, only one-half of the
otherwise-due interest would accrue for borrowers in partial financial hardship, thus providing an
additional benefit and form of forgiveness. See REPAYE Rules, supra note 134, at 67,205.
140. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(6). Under the new REPAYE rules, forgiveness would be after
twenty-five years for borrowers with any graduate student debt. See REPAYE Rules, supra note 134, at
67,205.
141. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c) (borrowers qualify for
ten-year forgiveness if they make regular payments under an income-based repayment plan or an
income-contingent repayment, and are employed full time by a public-service organization).
142. The twenty-year period is tolled during any period of default, however. Id. § 685.209(a)(6)(iv).
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the debtor the cash to pay the loan.143 Thus, the Internal Revenue Code treats
discharged indebtedness as income and taxes it accordingly.144 Although the
Code provides an exception to this for student loan debt discharged under a
program encouraging students to work in public service or the public interest,145
that exclusion does not currently apply to the more general twenty-year forgive-
ness under PAYE for borrowers working in other areas.146 As a result, PAYE
really forgives only about 60%–75% of the loan balance.147 Some lawmakers
have recognized this as a problem, however, and have introduced legislation to
extend the tax forgiveness to all income-driven loans.148 The White House’s
2014, 2015, and 2016 budget proposals also included calls to add an exclusion
from gross income for forgiven IBR and PAYE debts.149 Because this Article
addresses broader questions of the appropriateness of income-driven payments
for higher education, I ignore the specific cancellation of indebtedness income
issue.150
Early uptake of the programs was low,151 though it has begun to accelerate.
As of the fourth quarter of 2015, only about 21% of federal student loan
borrowers are enrolled in an income-driven repayment program.152 Less than
4% are in the newer PAYE version, though the number of borrowers with PAYE
loans has more than doubled each year and is now at 770,000.153 Although large
143. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929).
144. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012).
145. See id. § 108(f). Thus, the exclusion is applicable to PSLF loan forgiveness. See supra note
141.
146. See Gregory Crespi, Should We Defuse the “Tax Bomb” Facing Lawyers Who Are Enrolled in
Income-Based Student Loan Repayment Plans? (July 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract2615561; Letter from Eric Solomon, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, to Sander
Levin, U.S. Representative (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.finaid.org/loans/20080919
treasurylevinforgiveness.pdf.
147. The percentage could be even higher for a person in a lower tax bracket, but I am assuming that
the cancellation of debt income itself is likely to push a taxpayer at least into the 25% bracket.
148. See, e.g., H.R. 2492, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Ron Lieber, For Student Borrowers, Relief
Now May Mean a Big Tax Bill Later, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/
your-money/for-student-borrowers-a-tax-time-bomb.html.
149. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 209 (2013) [hereinafter 2014 BUDGET]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 190
(2014) [hereinafter 2015 BUDGET]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 53 (2015) [hereinafter 2016 BUDGET].
150. If the forgiveness is not excluded, the analysis is more complicated. See, e.g., Gregory S.
Crespi, Will the Income-Based Repayment Program Enable Law Schools to Continue to Provide
“Harvard-Style” Legal Education?, 67 SMU L. REV. 51, 85–99 (2014) (analyzing the financial effects
of the program assuming that a borrower also sets aside sufficient savings to pay the future tax due on
forgiveness).
151. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 135, at S-14 (“Despite the generous benefits, income-based
repayment take-up rates have been very low . . . .”). Uptake and awareness of earlier programs has also
been low. See Schrag, supra note 126, at 783–87.
152. Federal Student Aid, supra note 5. Note that these data do not include outstanding private
student loans made prior to 2008.
153. Id.
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and rapidly growing, these numbers are still only a small fraction of the 40
million people with some public or private student loan debt, however.154
The early low uptake rates were likely a function of, first, lack of knowledge,
and second, difficulty in actually enrolling in IBR or PAYE. First, there was
little marketing and promotion of IBR and PAYE initially, though the Depart-
ment of Education is now doing more direct outreach, including a partnership
with TurboTax and other tax preparers.155 Ironically, some lack of knowledge of
the program may also be because of how uncontroversial, and thus not newswor-
thy, passage was. The current IBR law was passed as part of the bill that enacted
“Obamacare,” and thus was perhaps less publicized than if it had been enacted
independently. Moreover, what debate there was on the student loan provisions
tended to focus more on the provisions repealing the subsidies to private
student-loan lenders and expanding Pell Grants, rather than on the IBR pro-
gram.156 And the estimated costs of the programs at the time of enactment were
minimal, which meant there was perhaps less to fight over.157 Although being
under the radar likely helped passage, it did not help initial student awareness.158
The second friction in uptake was the early difficulty for borrowers enrolling
in and then managing the system. Prior to 2012, the enrollment process was
confusing and buggy, and required significant paperwork and documentation.159
Once enrolled, borrowers are required to annually demonstrate their income and
family size,160 which is a heavy burden.161 As of this writing, the application
process has been streamlined, however, especially through use of an IRS Data
Retrieval Tool to import tax return data. Enrollment appears to be accelerating.162
154. Federal Student Aid, supra note 118.
155. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 135, at S-14 (on outreach efforts); Kelsey Snell, Student
Loan Debt Deal Comes with Tax Catch, POLITICO (Mar. 26, 2014, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/
story/2014/03/student-loan-debt-deal-taxes-105025 (on TurboTax partnership).
156. See, e.g., METTLER, supra note 122, at 69–87 (detailing the policy battles over student loan
reform).
157. See discussion infra Part III.B.
158. But see Philip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 387, 417–18 (2013) (challenging the idea that IBR and PAYE were under the radar,
given that, inter alia, Obama specifically called for expanded IBR in his 2010 State of the Union
speech).
159. See Memorandum from Barack Obama, President, to Arne Duncan, Sec’y of Educ., and
Timothy Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury, Improving Repayment Options for Federal Student Loan
Borrowers (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/07/
presidential-memorandum-improving-repayment-options-federal-student-loan; Press Release, Office of
the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Helping Americans Manage Student Loan Debt with
Improvements to Repayment Options (June 6, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/06/06/fact-sheet-helping-americans-manage-student-loan-debt-improvements-repay; Libby A.
Nelson, An Underused Lifeline, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2012/10/23/despite-student-debt-concern-income-based-repayment-lags.
160. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(5)(i)(A)–(C) (2015).
161. See, e.g., Kelly Field, Thousands Fall Out of Income-Based Repayment Plans, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/Thousands-Fall-Out-of/229031.
162. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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B. COST ESTIMATES
The PAYE program has the potential to be quite expensive, especially when
loan forgiveness starts around 2027163 (or earlier, with REPAYE available to
older borrowers). Despite this, the cost estimates at the time of the IBR law’s
passage (and also at the time PAYE was promulgated by regulation) are quite
murky, as are later estimates by the administration on the regulatory expansions.
As noted above, it is likely that low or nonexistent cost estimates helped to
ensure passage. Although a bit of a digression, this section provides some of the
background on the relevant budget rules around these cost estimates, as well as
more detail on the estimates themselves. These issues of cost are technical, but
they are central to the politics around student loans and provide a useful
window into the political economy of large-scale government programs.
Before getting into the cost estimates in detail, some basic budgeting rules
will be helpful. For most federal expenditures, Congress makes an estimate of
the costs over ten years—the so-called “budget window.” At first glance, that
may appear to lower the estimates for IBR and PAYE because forgiveness
would happen ten years after graduation at the earliest, which likely is outside
the budget window at the time of the bill’s passage. However, budget rules call
for different treatment of federal loans, student or otherwise. Under these rules,
the cost of a federal loan is recorded in the year that the loan is disbursed, and is
calculated as the net present value of expected net cash flows over the full life
of the loan, taking account of defaults, forgiveness, interest forbearance, and the
like.164 Thus, if there is some chance of default or of the loan balance being
forgiven at any point, even beyond ten years, an estimate of that would show up
in the budget in the year of the loan’s disbursement, as would the value of the
subsidies due to the cap on capitalized interest.165
Despite this, early cost estimates were still close to zero. When IBR was first
enacted in 2007 (the version that limited payments to 15% of discretionary
income, with forgiveness after twenty-five years), the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) only broke out the estimated costs for an earlier draft bill. In that
cost estimate, CBO estimated the total cost over ten years to be only $1.8
billion.166 This is because CBO assumed relatively little uptake because that
163. Technically, loans issued as early as October 2007 could qualify for PAYE, provided that the
borrower also took out new debt after October 1, 2011. See supra note 129. But the bigger volume of
loan forgiveness will begin around 2032.
164. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(B) (2012).
165. The government also readjusts the estimates of the cost of outstanding loans based on changes
in economic and other factors. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, FISCAL YEAR
2016 BUDGET PROPOSAL R-10 to R-12 (2015), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/
budget16/justifications/r-sloverview.pdf.
166. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2669: COLLEGE COST REDUCTION ACT OF 2007, at
4–7 (2007), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/costestimate/
hr26691.pdf. This earlier version of the bill allowed forgiveness after twenty years, rather than
twenty-five, which should have made this estimate higher than whatever the estimate would have been
for the final version.
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version of IBR required full interest capitalization, and because there had been
little uptake of the earlier Income-Contingent Repayment option.167
When IBR was changed in 2010 to payments of 10% of discretionary income
and forgiveness after twenty years, CBO did not provide a specific cost esti-
mate.168 However, the administration estimated the change to cost $7.4 billion
over ten years, though that included at least some loans going back to 2007, and
so actually covered fourteen, rather than ten, years of loans. The annual cost by
2020 was estimated to be over $1.2 billion per year—still tiny by budget
standards.169
The PAYE program was instituted in 2012 by regulation, and the administra-
tion estimated that the ten-year cost of the change from IBR to PAYE would be
an additional $2.1 billion.170 In addition to accelerating the implementation of
the program, PAYE also instituted the limitation on interest capitalization,
which should have changed uptake estimates based on CBO’s earlier methodol-
ogy; thus, it is surprising that the number was still so low, though as noted
below, the administration has recently revised upward the cost of existing PAYE
debt.
In its 2014 and 2015 budgets, the administration proposed extending PAYE to
loans made earlier than 2007. In the 2014 budget, it estimated the ten-year cost
of that change to be $6 billion,171 and in the 2015 budget, it estimated that cost
at $7.6 billion.172 The 2015 budget also proposed more limited forgiveness,
however,173 which lowered estimated costs for 2020 and beyond by around
half.174 The administration estimates that the extension of the new REPAYE
rules to pre-2015 borrowers would cost $8.3 billion, plus an additional $7.1
billion for the ten years beginning in 2016, though the annual estimates decrease
such that the budget estimate for 2025 is only $420 million based on an estimate
of an incremental 2 million borrowers above those who would be on PAYE or
IBR.175
The Department of Education’s 2016 budget, however, states that the ex-
pected net cost to the government of all outstanding loans increased by $21.8
billion in 2015, “due primarily to greater enrollment in income-driven repay-
167. Id.; see also Schrag, supra note 126, at 832–33 (discussing evidence that negative amortization
dissuaded many borrowers from using the earlier ICR program).
168. The IBR amendments were part of the HCERA—the Obamacare reconciliation bill—and CBO
did not break out the costs of IBR separately. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1081 (2010).
169. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 166 (2010).
170. Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088, 66,089 (Nov. 1, 2012) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pts. 674, 682, 685).
171. 2014 BUDGET, supra note 149, at 203.
172. 2015 BUDGET, supra note 149, at 178.
173. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 135, at S-13.
174. 2015 BUDGET, supra note 149, at 178.
175. See REPAYE Rules, supra note 134, at 67,228–30.
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ment plans, like IBR.”176 Assuming that covers eight years worth of loans,177
we could assume a rough annual cost of $2.8 billion per year, though that is a
backward-looking number.178 Importantly, this extra cost for the first time in
recent years pushed the overall student-loan program into a net subsidy posi-
tion, paying out on net more than it receives, in present value terms. The
Brookings Institution performed its own simulation, assuming (unrealistically)
full uptake of PAYE, and estimated a cost of $14 billion per loan cohort.179
In the end, the cost estimates are at best sketches, based on educated guesses
about the volume of loan forgiveness twenty years out. The reasonable range for
these estimates is somewhere between $3 billion and $10 billion per year,
meaning that on average, taxpayers will be transferring $3 billion–$10 billion
each year to college students through PAYE and other income-driven repayment
programs, though in cash flow terms these costs will not appear for a decade or
more. Although that is a big number, this is still well less than, for example, the
annual funding for the Pell Grant program, which is around $26 billion.180 More
importantly, it is far less than the nominal amounts of loans disbursed, which
was nearly $100 billion 2013–2014.181 As discussed in the next section and in
Part IV, the budgetary differences between funding higher education through
loans versus taxes are enormous even if the overall effects are similar.
C. LOAN PAYMENTS AS TAX PAYMENTS
Though described as a loan-forgiveness program, here I suggest that income-
driven repayment operates conceptually more like a progressive tax-and-
transfer program. As we will see, the effect of the PAYE program, if it were
widely adopted, would be as if the government paid tuition costs directly and
raised the money to do so in a somewhat progressive way and as a percentage of
income. Yet the spending would largely be off-budget because the budget
captures only the net of the loan outlay and repayment, rather than the total
176. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 165, at R-12.
177. Loans disbursed after October 1, 2007, may be eligible for IBR or PAYE.
178. The New American Foundation recently calculated a 2014 annual cost of $11 billion based on
the administration’s 2016 budget request, though, as they acknowledge, that estimate includes costs for
all prior-year loans that were consolidated in 2014, and thus includes more than just 2014-vintage loans. See
Jason Delisle, What Does Income-Based Repayment for Student Loans Cost?, EDCENTRAL (May 21, 2015),
http://www.edcentral.org/income-based-repayment-cost. Not including consolidated loans, they calculate the
2014 cost to be $2.8 billion—the same as my back-of-the-envelope calculation above. Id.
179. BETH AKERS & MATTHEW M. CHINGOS, STUDENT LOAN SAFETY NETS: ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT 15, 19 (2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu//media/
research/files/papers/2014/04/14%20student%20safety%20nets/ibr_online.pdf.
180. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROGRAM COSTS ASSUMING A MAXIMUM DISCRETIONARY AWARD
LEVEL OF $4,860 IN THE FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM—CBO’S APRIL 2014 BASELINE (2014), https://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44199-2014-04-Pell_Grant.pdf (projecting outlays of $26.4
billion for Pell Grants in 2014).
181. See COLL. BD., supra note 125.
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nominal cash flow.182
Consider two students graduating from a private four-year college, each with
$50,000 in student debt.183 The interest rate on the debt is 4.29%.184 Student 1
joins a large investment bank, starting at a $70,000 annual salary. Student 2
becomes a public school teacher, starting at a $35,000 annual salary.185 Both
have consistent wage growth over time. Both enroll in PAYE. Under that
program, each pays no more than 10% of discretionary income for twenty years,
if the banker, or ten years, if the teacher.186
Student 1 easily pays off the loan, following just the normal ten-year repay-
ment schedule, except for a few lower early payments. Student 2, on the other
hand, makes relatively small payments, and ends up having a significant amount
of debt forgiven in ten years. In present-value terms, more than $27,000 of the
initial $50,000 debt is written off.
Let us look again at the PAYE program and the example above, but this time
as a traditional tax-and-spending program. Under this view, the government
simply pays tuition costs directly to schools but then charges an additional tax
to former students, on top of typical income taxes, to partly pay those costs.
Former students enrolled in PAYE pay 10% of discretionary income—that is,
AGI less 150% of the poverty line.187 Because the standard deduction and
182. See supra Part III.B; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2015: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES:
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 37 (2014) (“The individual cash flows to and from the
public associated with the loans or guarantees, such as the disbursement and repayment of loans, the
default payments on loan guarantees, the collection of interest and fees, and so forth, are recorded in
the credit program’s non-budgetary financing account.” (emphasis added)). As I discuss in Part IV.A
below, there are important political economy ramifications from the government outlays on tuition
being off-budget.
183. This is on the high end. In 2013, 69% of student-loan borrowers had less than $25,000 in debt
because of the large fraction of students who attend low-cost undergraduate programs. See COLL. BD.,
supra note 125, at 27 fig.18A. For this reason, PAYE discussions have primarily focused on graduate
programs, such as law, teaching, and nursing, with the potential for high cost and low wages. However,
average student debt per borrower increased 35% 2004–2013. See id. at fig.18B.
184. As of 2014, the statutory interest rate for Direct Stafford Loans to undergraduates, both
subsidized and unsubsidized, is set at the ten-year Treasury Note rate in the year of the loan grant, plus
2.05%, with a cap of 8.25%. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8)(A) (2012). For 2015–2016, that rate was 4.29%.
See Federal Student Aid, Interest Rates and Fees, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/
interest-rates (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
185. The average starting salary for a teacher 2012–2013 was $36,141. 2012-2013 Average Starting
Teacher Salaries by State, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/2012-2013-average-starting-
teacher-salary.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
186. The following calculations are made using the IBR calculator at http://www.finaid.org/
calculators. For more on the calculators, see Schrag, supra note 126, at 804–05. Note that the
calculation uses the 2012 poverty level guidelines (the latest year available in the calculator), and thus
overstates slightly the out-of-pocket costs for 2015. The calculator also makes certain assumptions
about, for example, salary growth rates and inflation, which are noted at the above website.
187. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a)(3)(B) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(i) (2015). On the term
“discretionary income,” see supra note 136.
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personal exemptions are roughly equivalent to the poverty line,188 such a tax
looks similar to a tax of 10% of taxable income,189 so we could imagine PAYE
as a 10% income surtax on top of our existing income tax.190
Another tax-like feature of PAYE is that, in calculating the payment, the
regulations include income of both the borrower and the borrower’s spouse,191
much as the income tax treats a married couple as a single tax unit with a single
combined income. This is in contrast to the traditional student loan, where the
debtor is just the individual.192
But this simple story breaks down quickly because there are a number of
complications to consider. First, the “discretionary income” base is somewhat
smaller than the taxable income base for having a larger zero bracket—150%
versus 100% of the poverty line, roughly. That, plus that AGI is arguably a
better measure of economic income than taxable income is, means that there is a
little bit of progressivity baked in at the low ends. Student 2 in the example
above, for example, starts off paying about 5% of AGI, whereas Student 1 pays
about 7.5% of AGI.193
Second, under IBR and PAYE194 the monthly payments are capped at what
would have been the typical ten-year amortization payment—$513.15, if a
$50,000 loan. That means that a former student with this debt making more than
$79,233 actually pays less than 10% of discretionary income.195 These two
features combined mean that PAYE starts out with increasing rates at low
188. See John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between
Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203, 212 (discussing historical connection between
standard deduction and the poverty line).
189. The income tax is levied against the tax base defined as “taxable income.” I.R.C. § 1 (2012).
For most taxpayers, “taxable income” is equal to AGI minus the combination of the standard deduction
and personal exemptions. See id. § 63(b).
190. See D. BRUCE JOHNSTONE & PAMELA N. MARCUCCI, FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION WORLDWIDE:
WHO PAYS? WHO SHOULD PAY? 153 (2010) (noting similarities between an income-contingent loan and a
graduate tax); Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing
Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard, 11 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 55, 77 (2009) (stating that
the only difference between an income-contingent loan and a graduate tax is that loans are opt-in); Panu
Poutvaara, Educating Europe: Should Public Education Be Financed with Graduate Taxes or Income-
Contingent Loans?, 50 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 663 (2004).
191. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(v)(B). A married individual who files separately does not, under
current law, include a spouse’s income. Id. § 685.209(a)(1)(v)(A). The new REPAYE program com-
bines household income for married individuals who file separately. See REPAYE Rules, supra note
134, at 67,205.
192. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.212(a)(1) (discharging the student loan if the borrower has died).
193. Treating the salary as the AGI, Student 1 pays 10% of the difference between $70,000 and
150% the relevant poverty line ($11,770 in 2015, Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80
Fed. Reg. 3236, 3237 (Jan. 22, 2015)), or about $5235 per year—7.5% of the student’s salary. Student 2
pays 10% of the difference between $35,000 and 150% of $11,770, or about $1735 per year—5% of the
student’s salary.
194. Under REPAYE, there is no cap on the 10% payment. See REPAYE Rules, supra note 134, at
67,213–14. However, it is relatively easy for a high-income borrower to switch out of REPAYE and
into a traditional loan program.
195. That is, $513.15 per month is equal to 10% of discretionary income at an AGI of $79,233.
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income levels, but then has decreasing rates after a peak.196 The peak will be
different for different loan amounts (and interest rates),197 but eventually the
payments do shrink as a percentage of income as income increases.
Third, the tax is not indefinite or even for a fixed number of years. One pays
the above percentages only until the nominal debt is either paid off or forgiven.
Thus, in some cases a high-income graduate could stop paying the PAYE “tax”
sooner than the low-income graduate, even though the high-income graduate
pays more in dollar terms.198
Fourth, there are limits to how much an undergraduate can borrow using
loans eligible for PAYE. The most in total that an undergraduate can borrow is
$31,000 if the student is dependent (and only $27,000 for the first four years) or
$57,500 if the student is independent.200 For an undergraduate degree in 2014,
this may be sufficient, especially for public universities, because of the combina-
tion of other forms of aid, such as institutional grants, public subsidies, Pell
Grants, Perkins loans, and work-study. In addition, Direct PLUS loans are
196. See infra Figure 1.
197. For a debt of $150,000, for example, the peak point is at a salary of around $202,000.
198. This is unlikely to be the case for low-income graduates in public-interest jobs because PSLF
forgiveness is at ten years, the same period over which a traditional loan is fully paid. But a low-income
graduate in a non-public-interest job may be paying 10% of discretionary income for twenty years,
whereas a higher-income graduate may stop paying after as few as ten years.
199. Figure 1 is based on a poverty level of $11,770 and a $50,000 loan at 4.29% interest.
200. 34 C.F.R. § 685.203(e) (2015).
Figure 1. Payment Schedule (%AGI)199
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available to parents, though such loans are not eligible for PAYE.201 Finally,
there is some residual private lending if these other sources are not sufficient.
But as tuitions keep rising, these borrowing caps may put some strain on a
student’s ability to finance tuition with PAYE-eligible debt.202
For graduate students, however, there is no limit to the amount of PAYE-
eligible debt. There is a cap on aggregate Direct Loans (in contrast to Direct
PLUS Loans) of $138,500, which also includes any undergraduate debt.203 But
graduate students can also take out Direct PLUS loans themselves up to the
school’s cost of attendance,204 and such loans qualify for PAYE and IBR.205
Thus, PAYE-eligible loans can cover essentially the full tuition and living
expenses for any graduate program. This skews the PAYE benefits toward
graduate education, though that may be justified in part by the existence of more
generous direct aid for undergraduates, such as Pell Grants.
Fifth, under the current rules, the twenty-year forgiveness creates taxable
income from the discharge of indebtedness.206 Although nominally a tax-like
feature, this actually acts like a balloon payment or a form of liquidated
damages—an amount of money that the government aims to collect, with only
limited regard for the borrower’s ability to pay.207 Thus, with regard to that
amount, the government stands again more like a creditor than a tax agency.
That said, the administration has proposed excluding the income from the
twenty-year forgiveness, in addition to the ten-year forgiveness.208
Finally, PAYE and IBR, as loan programs, are administered by the Education
Department, not the Internal Revenue Service.209 Early implementation of IBR
and PAYE was criticized as cumbersome, with a difficult enrollment process
and complicated annual approval procedures, though the situation is improving
as of this writing.210
201. Id. § 685.209(a)(1)(ii).
202. The amount of private lending has crept up somewhat since the initial drop when the subsidy
for private student loan lenders was repealed. See supra note 125.
203. 34 C.F.R. § 685.203(e). For graduate students in health profession programs, the aggregate
limit is $224,000. Information for Financial Aid Professionals, Aggregate Loan Limit for Graduate and
Professional Students Preparing for the Health Professions, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Apr. 18, 2008),
https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/041808GEN0804.html.
204. 34 C.F.R. § 685.203(f)–(g); see also Philip G. Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Loan
Repayment Assistance Programs with New Federal Legislation, 583 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591–92 (2011).
205. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(ii) (limiting the exclusion of Direct PLUS loans to those made to a
parent); Federal Student Aid, PLUS Loans, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/plus
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
206. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
207. The borrower would still have the advantage of the graduated tax rate structure and other
features of the income tax that provide for progressive payments, though she still would not have the
actual cash.
208. See supra note 149.
209. Compare Australia’s similar HELP program, in which the tax agency collects payments through
tax returns. See infra Part IV.B.2.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 159–62.
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As a result of these complications, the simple story of PAYE as a tax-and-
transfer program is not quite accurate, but neither is the simple story of students
just paying back a loan. The current system is a partial hybrid of the two,
combining a baseline income tax-like payment with the caps and finite terms of
a loan program.211 A key policy question, therefore, is whether the program should
become more tax-like, and if so, whether alternative structures, such as full public
funding, would be more appropriate. The next Part turns to these questions.
IV. INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT AS PROGRESSIVE PUBLIC FUNDING
In this Part, I first lay out the theoretical case for income-driven repayment as
a method of public higher-education funding, especially as compared to both
U.S.-style need-based grants and Continental Europe-style full public funding.
As I discuss in section A, there is a good case for using income-driven
repayment, but it is far from sure and depends heavily on system design and
implementation. Drawing on some analysis of other forms of income-driven
repayment in section B, I return to the design and implementation question in
section C and suggest possible changes to PAYE to address some of the
problems the Article identifies. These suggested changes differ from those
offered by the Obama administration and other analysts, and this is largely
because these reform suggestions arise out of the specific analytic framework of
this Article—that income-driven repayment should be thought of more as a tax
program than a loan program. Section D addresses the specific and important
criticism that income-driven repayment encourages borrowers to take on exces-
sive levels of debt. I explain in that section why this should not be a significant
problem.
A. THE CASE FOR INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT
As laid out in Part II.A, U.S. higher-education finance has evolved to a
consensus that funding should be largely through a combination of direct,
211. There are other possible framings of IBR. One alternative would be to view it purely as a
transfer program, whereby the government picks up the tab for some tuition costs based on an
individual’s income, much as it does for food (SNAP), health care (Medicaid), and other costs (TANF
and EITC). But unlike those programs, which are for goods typically purchased and consumed all in
one period, higher education paid for with debt is purchased in one or more periods, and then paid for
over many future periods. Thus, the subsidy comes in the form of reduced debt payments (and ultimate
forgiveness) rather than an upfront subsidy for tuition. This is what creates the ex post progressivity
discussed earlier: rather than subsidize tuition based on ability to pay at the time of enrollment and
payment, it is subsidized based on ability to pay after leaving college. The loan structure, with the
government as lender, also means that the government pays everything up front, and simply seeks
different levels of repayment from different individuals, as opposed to only subsidizing the initial
purchase. Ultimately, however, the distinction between tax and transfer is arbitrary, and any progressive
tax could instead be framed as a progressive transfer and vice versa. Imagine, for example, a lump-sum
head tax in which every person pays an equal amount of tax in dollar terms, the revenue from which is
then used to make direct payments that vary with income and other factors in such a way that the
distribution of after-tax income is exactly the same as under our current tax system. Another possible
framing is as a substitute for bankruptcy. See infra Part IV.D.
2016] 263INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT
debt-financed tuition on students, with need-based grants for those low-income
students and families who would otherwise be unable to pay tuition. In many
other countries, especially Western Europe, higher education is instead fully or
largely funded out of general revenue. Thus, a first key question is how an
income-driven repayment program, such as PAYE, compares with these two
other methods.212 With our framing of PAYE as a tax-and-transfer program, we
can also ask the question in a slightly different way: should the transfers
necessary to achieve optimal levels of higher education go (mostly) from
taxpayers generally to needy (or all) students ex ante, or (mostly) from high-
income former students to needy former students ex post?
We can break that question down further. First, how well would an income-
driven loan program, relative to the other options, serve the policy goals
motivating public spending on higher education, namely expanding access
while alleviating the pressures of cost increases? Second, what would be the
distributional effects of an income-driven program, especially given the distribu-
tional incidence of the cost disease? Third, what effects would an income-driven
program have on deadweight loss and excess burden? Would it be more or less
economically efficient than other forms of higher-education finance?213
1. Targeted Spending on Public Policy Goals
There are important public benefits from expanding higher education.214
Much of these can come simply from increasing the supply of people with
skills, which in turn can lead to higher economic growth, more social mobility,
and less income inequality, plus higher social welfare simply from increasing
individuals’ welfare.
Although there are many educational, social, and cultural factors that may be
limiting the number of people seeking post-secondary education, from the
financial side there are essentially two barriers: high upfront costs and an
aversion to the downside risk of high debt for those with low future income.
Need-based grants, full public funding, and income-driven repayment can each
lower both barriers, whereas traditional loans lower only the first barrier but
leave borrowers exposed to the risk of future low income. But for need-based
grants, full public funding, and income-driven repayment, the classes of subsidy
recipients differ. With full public funding, everyone receives the subsidy. With
need-based grants, those with low parental income or wealth at the time of
enrollment receive the subsidies. And with an income-driven repayment pro-
gram, those with low income after leaving school receive the subsidies. The full
212. We could also compare it to all students simply paying out of pocket. I effectively rule this
option out for the reasons laid out in Part I.
213. Note that these three questions roughly line up with the three ways David Schizer argues that
we should analyze tax expenditures, by looking at the programmatic benefits, the effects on distribu-
tion, and the degree of excess burden, respectively. See David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures,
68 TAX L. REV. 275, 289–90 (2015).
214. See supra Part I.A.
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public funding model is almost certainly wildly over-inclusive if the intent is to
drive enrollment, especially given that the private benefits from higher educa-
tion are still large.215 The comparison of need-based grants with an income-
driven repayment program is more complex, however.
The population of income-driven subsidy recipients can be roughly divided
into four categories: those who enter low-income, but high-positive externality
careers (such as teaching or public interest law); those who are simply
unlucky;216 those who do not have the ability to earn sufficient income to
reasonably cover tuition or loan payments;217 and those who have the ability,
but not the inclination, to earn sufficient income—the high-ability “beach-
comber.”218 The first group is the appropriate target for programmatic subsidies,
and the second is the appropriate target for social insurance.219 Yet need-based
grants are not aimed at either group. Directing a subsidy only to those with low
parental income or wealth, as need-based grants do, targets public spending
without any regard for either public externalities or social insurance.220 A child
of two schoolteachers may go on to be a schoolteacher or a hedge fund
manager, and there is little reason to subsidize the latter’s education, no matter
the parents’ income.221
However, the third and fourth groups are arguably the wrong recipients of
higher-education subsidies.222 For an income-driven program to be successful
215. Of course, this may be offset by higher-income former students who will later pay higher taxes.
But, first, this does not differentiate between those who received the free higher education and those
who did not, and second, it requires much higher nominal tax revenue to achieve results than do
need-based grants or IBR. See infra Part IV.A.3.
216. This is a loaded term. Depending on one’s definition of “luck,” the second and third category
could be combined, given that ability is also determined by a lottery, in a sense. See Brooks, supra note
87, at 99. Here, I mean “unlucky” as being on the low end of the income distribution for people with
similar characteristics, rather than on the low end of the distribution of such characteristics in the first
place.
217. Defining ability in the broadest possible sense, including propensity to gain and use skills,
predilection toward higher earning fields, social capital and family position, and so on.
218. Arguably, the third and fourth categories could be collapsed, if one considered traits such as
desire for leisure or willingness to expend effort as a subset of “ability.” Indeed, even the desire to work
in a low-income but high positive externality field could be thought of as a part of ability. The difficulty
of drawing these sorts of lines is one reason why the income tax does not attempt to do so, treating
income alone as the sole basis for allocating tax burdens, regardless of why a person has a particular
income.
219. Schrag notes a similar set of transfers. Schrag, supra note 158, at 405.
220. See Lance Lochner & Alexander Monge-Naranjo, Student Loans and Repayment: Theory,
Evidence and Policy 81–82 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20849, 2015),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20849 (using a theoretical student loan model to show, inter
alia, that insurance should be a key principle in student loan program design).
221. The hedge fund manager’s K–12 education was subsidized if the manager attended public
school. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze all the possible cross-subsidies that high-income
individuals might receive at one time or another, but we can at least say that minimizing such subsidies
is worthwhile.
222. Importantly, I mean “wrong” leaving aside any distributional concerns, which are addressed in
the next section. The issue for this section is purely the programmatic grounds for spending public
money to increase the total volume of higher education in cost-effective ways.
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on programmatic grounds, therefore, the benefits of the transfers to the first two
groups should exceed the costs of misdirecting to the third and fourth groups.
The costs of the third group, those with lower ability, can be managed in part
through educational policies and incentives to direct individuals to the appropri-
ate educational services, such as university admissions policies, as well as
policies to manage adverse selection. Neither the student nor society is well
served by a school accepting the student to a program the student is unlikely to
complete, particularly when the debt is payable regardless.223 More positively,
however, the costs of misallocation to this group can also be addressed by trying
to increase ability, especially through primary and secondary education. But
there are still real risks, especially given that there is already a serious misalloca-
tion problem in federal student loans. A disproportionate amount of federal
loans go to students attending for-profit schools,224 for example, which have
notoriously bad results in terms of graduation rates and career placement.225 Yet
these problems could be exacerbated under income-driven repayment.
The costs of the fourth group, the high-ability beachcombers, could also be
exacerbated by the moral hazard effects of income-driven repayment. If the
highly educated beachcomber faced a high loan payment, he might feel com-
pelled to work harder, or he might reconsider higher education altogether. But if
some of the risks of low income are removed by income-driven repayment,
there would be less incentive against simply collecting degrees while working
on one’s tan. How much less incentive, however, is an empirical question.
Related work in public finance tends to show that income tax rates that vary
with income have little effect on work effort for most people,226 and it is not
clear why loan repayment rates that vary with income would have a different
effect.
Furthermore, if we complicate the idea of the beachcomber to also include
those who simply choose less demanding (or, alternatively, more financially
risky) jobs because of personal preferences, the proper result is not so obvi-
ous.227 It is not at all clear that we would describe as a virtue of our current loan
223. Again, this is leaving aside any equity-based reason for providing relief to someone in that
situation. See infra note 236.
224. For 2007–2008, 94% of bachelor’s degree recipients at for-profit schools had federal loans,
whereas only 69% did at private nonprofit schools and 58% at public schools. METTLER, supra note 40,
at 36.
225. See id. at 34–36.
226. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income
with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 3–4 (2012)
(surveying literature).
227. Here, the fourth group can overlap with the first because it is difficult to untangle a desire for
leisure from a desire for lower income work. If anything, we probably have too many talented
individuals working in finance, corporate law, and specialized medicine, rather than in entrepreneur-
ship, public interest law, and family medicine, for example. Many of those people might choose careers
differently if not facing large loan payments. See Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained
After College: Student Loans and Early-Career Occupational Choices, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 149, 158, 162
(2011) (finding that high student debts lead graduates to choose higher-paying jobs, and vice versa,
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system that graduates may be forced to work more or in different fields than
they would otherwise prefer if they did not have high loan payments.228 Income
is generally thought to be reward enough, and if a person would choose a
particular labor-leisure trade-off given potential income, we ought not to intro-
duce a crippling loan payment to distort that choice.229 Moreover, income-
driven repayment hardly removes the risk of low income. Shrinking the required
loan payment is helpful, but many of the other risks of low income will remain.
All that said, program design is crucial to minimizing these potential moral
hazard costs,230 and some degree of government regulation and monitoring is
likely required, though this is also true of the traditional loan program.231
Furthermore, the above analysis assumes that students consider only the ex-
pected financial benefits and costs of the programs, and are indifferent to the
structure—reducing upfront tuition costs versus reducing later debt payments.
If, however, students are debt-averse,232 even if irrationally so, or the complex-
ity of the PAYE program introduces a friction,233 then need-based grants should
still play a role in increasing access.234
contrary to what standard life-cycle theory would predict). To the degree that that constitutes moral
hazard, it would be “good” moral hazard—that is, somewhat costly, but still desirable on balance. See
Brooks, supra note 87, at 131–32.
228. See Schrag & Pruett, supra note 4, at 587 (discussing survey results showing that high debt
dissuades law students from taking public interest jobs).
229. One could make the argument, relying on the optimal tax literature, that a loan payment
functions like a lump-sum tax on ability (college being a proxy for ability, and the standard loan
payment not being a function of income) and therefore would not induce a distortionary substitution
from labor to leisure. Then all that would remain would be a nondistortionary income effect. But a more
complete social welfare function would have to take into account the utility losses from, inter alia,
pushing people into undesired careers.
230. See Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, supra note 220, at 82 (using a theoretical student loan model
to show, inter alia, that management of incentive problems should be a key principle in student loan
program design).
231. The Obama Administration has proposed stricter standards on schools that accept federal loans
and on for-profit schools generally. See, e.g., Stephanie Simon & Caitlin Emma, Barack Obama Cracks
Down on For-Profit Colleges, POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2014, 9:53 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/
03/barack-obama-education-for-profit-colleges-104661; see also infra note 329.
232. See, e.g., Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial
Aid Experiment at NYU Law School, 1 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 2 (2009) (finding evidence that
students planning to enter public interest law jobs preferred upfront tuition waivers, with potential
repayment later if they had higher income, to upfront debt with income-driven repayment, despite the
financial equivalence of the two programs, likely because of the nominal debt for the latter program);
Benjamin M. Marx & Lesley J. Turner, Borrowing Trouble? Student Loans, the Cost of Borrowing, and
Implications for the Effectiveness of Need-Based Grant Aid 22, 28–33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20850, 2015), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20850 (finding that $1 of
Pell Grant Aid leads to an average $1.80 reduction in debt, implying a fixed cost of borrowing, some of
which may be a “psychic” cost).
233. See, e.g., Susan Dynarski & Judith Scott-Clayton, Financial Aid Policy: Lessons from Research
21–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18710, 2013), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w18710 (summarizing research finding that complexity limits effectiveness of financial aid).
234. See id. at 19–21 (summarizing research finding that access to aid and other forms of cost
reduction increases college access). But see id. at 22–23 (summarizing research suggesting that Pell
Grant availability may not increase enrollments).
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2. Equity and Distribution
The question of distributional equity is related to the first question but distinct
conceptually. The first question addresses the appropriate allocation of govern-
ment’s spending on public goods and social insurance. The second addresses
government’s role in distribution: from whom and to whom should income be
redistributed, if at all?235 In this subsection, I first try to answer this general
theoretical question, and then analyze the redistributive effect of the current
PAYE program.
a. Theory. Consider the following table, which categorizes transfers to stu-
dents based on whether their postgraduation income is high or low, and also
whether their parents’ income is high or low at the time of enrollment.236 The
table uses PAYE as shorthand for all of income-driven repayment, and Pell as
shorthand for need-based ex ante aid.
As the table shows, with respect to low-income former students with low-
income parents, and with respect to high-income former students with high-
income parents, income-driven repayment and need-based aid essentially act the
same—transfers in one case (the fourth quadrant), but not the other (the first
quadrant). In both cases, that is the appropriate answer from an equity stand-
235. Note that this distinction lines up with Musgrave’s conceptual separation of government into
the Allocation and Distribution Branches (along with the Stabilization Branch). See RICHARD A.
MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 5–22 (1959). Distinguishing
between these two functions of a tax-and-transfer system can be difficult in practice, however, because
the effects overlap. See Brooks, supra note 87, at 94–101.
236. I am grateful to Ruth Mason for suggesting such a table. The table is a simplification for
illustrative purposes. Income is more of a spectrum, and there are also other dimensions to consider,
such as wealth. Also, on equity grounds there is little reason to determine why someone might have low
income, in contrast to my approach in Part IV.A.1. In this view, redistribution is not an issue of merit, or
of ex ante decisions, but rather an issue of ex post results. For example, those in the third group from
Part IV.A.1—those with lower ability—are a reasonable target for redistributive policies, even if not
educational subsidies. Even if the government should not subsidize inappropriate education choices ex
ante, it ought to be sympathetic to those who have to live with those choices ex post. But a further
discussion of equity norms and justice is beyond the scope of this Article.
Table 1. Which Students Receive Transfers?
STUDENT POST-GRAD INCOME
PARENT INCOME HIGH LOW
HIGH PAYE ✗ PAYE ✓
Pell ✗ Pell ✗
LOW PAYE ✗ PAYE ✓
Pell ✓ Pell ✓
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point. It is in the second and third quadrants that the two programs differ.237
Looking at the third quadrant, need-based aid causes a transfer to a high-
income former student, but income-driven repayment does not. Because the
student should be the focus of the equity analysis, income-driven repayment
produces a more equitable result than need-based aid for this group. The more
difficult “to whom” question, however, is regarding the group of low-income
former students with high-income parents—the second quadrant. Even if one
accepts that there might be programmatic reasons to subsidize at least some of
those students’ choices (for example, if they enter low-income, but high positive-
externality careers),238 there are few equity reasons for doing so. This is a
concern because wealthy parents with children who plan low-income careers
would be well advised just to pay their child’s PAYE loan payment rather than
pay upfront tuition; that would leave greater wealth to transfer directly to the
child.
Weighing against that risk, however, is a strong social norm of paying for a
child’s education when possible; rich parents are likely to continue to pay out of
pocket rather than direct their children to loans, at least in the near term.239
Furthermore, in other redistributive programs we typically disregard a parent’s
income or wealth, at least until it is actually transferred. For example, an adult
child’s income tax rate or eligibility for certain transfers is, in most cases, based
only on the child’s own income and not the parents’.240 Nonetheless, for
income-driven repayment to be superior to need-based aid on equity grounds,
program design to minimize excessive transfers to this group is important.
In addition to the “to whom” question, there is also the “from whom”
question of whether that redistribution should come disproportionately from
successful former students, as it could with certain forms of income-driven
repayment, or from taxpayers at large, as it would for both need-based grants
and full public funding.241 What makes this question particularly difficult is that
we already have a progressive income-tax structure, meaning that a high-
income former student will end up paying more back into the system regardless,
simply by virtue of having higher income. Thus, the question really is whether
the high-income graduate should pay more than a high-income nongraduate
with the same income.
237. As in Part IV.A.1, I again dismiss full public funding, at least on the “to whom” question,
because the transfers in that case go to everyone rather than a means-tested subgroup. The “from
whom” question is a more difficult one that I address below.
238. See supra Part IV.A.1.
239. Particularly because there are capital gains and gift tax incentives to transfer wealth in the form
of college tuition. See I.R.C. § 529 (2012).
240. This ignores the question of whether a child bears some of the incidence of tax on the parents
or the parents’ estate, but that is a disputed claim and not central to this issue.
241. The amounts transferred would be larger for full public funding than for need-based grants,
though the population of transferors is the same: high-income taxpayers.
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From a horizontal equity standpoint, income alone would not justify tax
differences between those two individuals.242 Looking beyond just income
levels though, there are relevant differences. First, higher education is still
valuable above and beyond its ability to increase income: it can increase utility
and wellbeing more broadly. If a person has received that benefit from the
government, the government would be justified in seeking some additional
payment, beyond just higher income tax payments.243
Second, the income-driven borrower has also received an insurance benefit
against the risk of impoverishment by high loan payments (or lack of savings) if
the borrower has low income. In section IV.A.1, I said that social insurance is
an appropriate form of public spending.244 Here, the question is how the costs
of that insurance should be allocated. Income-driven repayment, like all redis-
tributive programs, contains an insurance element, namely that the borrower
faces some ex-ante risk of future low income, and paying full student loan
payments (or draining the student’s or parents’ savings) in that case could drive
the person into destitution.245 Income-driven repayment allows the borrower to
minimize that risk by instead spreading it across all borrowers, and to some
degree all taxpayers, just as other social insurance programs do.246 That benefit
exists ex ante even if the borrower’s income remains high ex post, and so in that
sense the PAYE borrower is better off than the traditional borrower, even if both
are currently making the same loan payments at the traditional ten-year loan
rate.247 Therefore, because high-income former students disproportionately ben-
efit from the system, it is appropriate that they also disproportionately support
the program, at least somewhat.
b. Current Rules. PAYE, as currently designed, is partially redistributive in
three ways: first, in charging high-income borrowers an interest rate above the
242. We could say that a person with higher education might have somewhat more ability than a
person who does not, even if they have equal income—that it is a “tag” for ability. But we generally
accept income as the sole proxy for ability, and this does not seem like the place to depart from that.
Otherwise, we would also have to consider other tags for ability, such as height. See N. Gregory
Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income
Redistribution, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 155 (2010).
243. Here I am distinguishing these nonpecuniary benefits from those benefits that could increase a
person’s income-producing ability. Those benefits should be picked up by income itself. If they are not,
then we are left with the task of this section, of trying to tease out why—whether due to career choice,
luck, desire for leisure, or another factor.
244. See supra note 217.
245. On the insurance component of redistributive tax-and-transfer programs, see, for example,
Brooks, supra note 87, at 94–101, and Hilary W. Hoynes & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Insurance Value of
State Tax-and-Transfer Programs, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1466, 1466–67 (2011). On the relationship of
income insurance to an egalitarian or Rawlsian approach to justice in taxation, see, for example, LIAM
MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 54–57 (2002), and Brooks,
supra note 87, at 99–100.
246. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL
INSURANCE 27 (1999) (defining social insurance as insurance against inadequate labor income).
247. Recall that under the current IBR and PAYE plans, the borrower switches back to paying the
typical loan payment once that payment becomes less than 10% of discretionary income.
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government’s borrowing rate, the revenue from which can be used to subsidize
forgiveness of principal and interest for low-income borrowers; second, in
deferring payments for those with low income in a given period; and third, in
forgiving the debts of low-income borrowers after some period, though this
benefit may be muted somewhat by the possibility of taxable income from the
debt forgiveness.
Of these, the deferral benefit requires a bit more unpacking. If the deferred
amounts, including interest, simply accrued and were subject to the same
statutory interest rate, there would be no deferral benefit—the amounts paid
would be the same in present-value terms in any period.248 Full interest capital-
ization for those who no longer had a “partial financial hardship” (that is, whose
standard loan payment was no longer greater than 10% of discretionary in-
come249) was a feature of IBR as enacted in 2007 and as extended in 2010,250
and thus the CBO originally projected relatively little uptake in the program
because the present value benefit of IBR was minimal.251 Under the PAYE
regulations, however, the amount of capitalized interest is limited to 10% of the
original principal balance.252 As a result, for PAYE, some interest goes unpaid
in present value terms, and the lower one’s income relative to the debt, the more
goes unpaid. This thus provides PAYE an additional element of redistribution in
present-value terms.253
Who pays for this redistribution? To some degree, higher-income graduates
do. Although 4.29% is a low market interest rate, it is set statutorily to be 2.05%
higher than the government’s borrowing rate,254 and that spread is essentially
profit to the government (though some question this accounting255). So, students
able to fully pay off their loans would, at the current statutory rates, end up also
248. See Daniel I. Halperin & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Understanding Income Tax Deferral, 67 TAX L.
REV. 317 (2014) (discussing the role of accrual in considering deferral benefits). Though in that case, we
could describe the deferred payments as redistributive within-person—redistribution from a richer
future self to a poorer current self—and arguably a good portion of our redistributive tax-and-transfer
system operates in that way. See Brooks, supra note 87, at 99–101; Hoynes & Luttmer, supra note 245,
at 1467 (identifying the within-person component of redistribution).
249. See supra notes 136–39.
250. See supra note 139.
251. See supra note 166.
252. See supra note 139. Additional unpaid interest still accrues but is not capitalized. Id.
253. This benefit would be even larger under the new REPAYE plan, which also forgives half of the
otherwise-accrued interest while the borrower is in partial financial hardship. See supra note 134.
254. See supra note 184.
255. Some analysts encourage the government to use “fair-value accounting,” whereby instead of
discounting future loan revenues and costs using the government borrowing rate, as required under the
Federal Credit Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(E) (2012), the government would use market borrowing
rates which better reflect credit risk and thus provide a sort of risk adjustment. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF SELECTED FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR 2015 TO 2024, at
1–4 (2014); Jason Delisle & Jason Richwine, The Case for Fair-Value Accounting, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Fall
2014, at 95, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20140918_Delisle.Richwine.pdf. Under
fair-value accounting, the overall student loan program would provide a larger net subsidy to borrow-
ers. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra, at 1–2. But there are strong arguments against the fair-value approach
to government budgeting, and it is not the dominant methodology. See, e.g., David Kamin, Risky
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partially subsidizing those with lower incomes. But any necessary funding
beyond that must come instead from general revenues. And indeed, the adminis-
tration’s 2016 budget reflects for the first time that PAYE borrowers receive a
net subsidy on average, meaning that the federal student loan system is some-
what supported by general revenues.256
The relatively light degree of redistribution is because of the annual and
lifetime payments caps; an individual’s monthly payment will not exceed what
the ten-year loan service payment would have been,257 and the individual stops
paying altogether once the payments total the unpaid principal and interest. This
causes the payment schedule to take the unusual shape depicted in Figure 1.
Current proposals to increase progressivity focus on reform to these payments
caps. However, as I discuss below, these efforts may not be effective alone.258
3. Economic Efficiency
Finally, the third way in which income-driven repayment may be superior to
direct grants—and definitely superior to full public funding—is that it may
provide for lower effective tax rates and thus less deadweight loss. This happens
for two key reasons. First, income-driven repayment has the potential to cost
less in present value terms than direct grants because it does not over-subsidize
future rich college graduates—the inframarginal consumers who would con-
sume the good anyway259—and because it allows many borrowers twenty years
to repay, thus making it likely that most borrowers will pay the full tuition costs.
Even using the current highest estimates for PAYE costs, they are still far less
than the cost of Pell Grants in present value terms.260
The second reason is more subtle and requires me to introduce the idea of
“quasi-public spending.” I address quasi-public spending in depth in a fol-
low-up article,261 so what follows here is just a brief description. The basic idea
is that government can structure public-good provision in an “off-budget”
manner, whereby a good is provided in part through direct payments by
recipients of the good and in part by more limited taxes and subsidies that, all
together, can mimic the sort of allocative and distributional effects of a tradi-
tional public spending program—thus my term “quasi-public spending.”262
Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 723 (2013) (arguing against the
fair-value methodology and risk adjustment generally in federal budgeting).
256. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
257. Under REPAYE, a borrower will continue to pay 10% of discretionary income at all income
levels and will not default back to the standard 10-year loan payment. However, because switching out
of REPAYE is straightforward, there will still be effectively a cap. See supra note 134.
258. See infra Part IV.C.1.
259. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV.
177, 180 (1989) (noting that mandated employee benefits do not affect wages, and thus levels of
employment, for the inframarginal employees already receiving the benefit).
260. See discussion supra notes 180–81.
261. See Brooks, supra note 8.
262. In other words, there is some separation between Musgrave’s Allocation and Distribution
Branches of government. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 235, at 6.
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A key feature of the quasi-public spending model is that much of the
spending on the good or service is made by individuals rather than government;
therefore, it does not add to the nominal size of the public sector, nor does it
appear to raise nominal taxes. There may still be a direct cost to the government
due to subsidies but much less than if the good or service were supplied directly.
This can potentially make the political process smoother because the budgetary costs
will be much lower than if the government supplied the good or service directly.263
Furthermore, because the distributional element can be both more flexible
and less salient, it is possible to design a system with less overall distortion. The
flexibility allows lawmakers to charge an individual an amount closer to
the good’s benefit to the individual, with more targeted redistribution just where
necessary to increase provision. If the net cost to an individual is close to the
degree of benefit, there will be little or no distortion to the individual’s work
effort.264 And if the distributional element is less salient, then the program could
be less distortionary even with the same effective marginal tax rates as a
traditional public spending program.265
Higher-education tuition payments are nominally out-of-pocket, even if funded
with debt, meaning that students face a price, rather than a tax, for higher
education.266 The income-driven loan payment and forgiveness structure intro-
duces a degree of progressivity, but that progressivity exists in large part to
improve access and risk-sharing, not as a broader tool for redistribution, and
thus can be somewhat more limited than the progressivity of the primary tax
system. Furthermore, if that progressivity is achieved in part through instru-
ments like the loan interest rate,267 it may be less salient to the high-income
borrowers asked to disproportionately support the system. On the other hand,
reduced payments and forgiveness are likely to be highly salient to those in
partial financial hardship, which could lead to inefficient behaviors by those at
the margin, such as hiding income or lowering work effort.268
263. See James M. Poterba, Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health
Care: How and Why?, in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE,
AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 277, 291 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996) (“In times of fiscal stringency,
such as the present, mandates may be particularly attractive to policy makers because they provide a
mechanism for affecting real activity without spending money.”).
264. See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of
Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 515–16 (1996); Summers, supra note 259, at 181 (noting that mandated
employee benefits can mimic the effects of lump-sum taxes).
265. If the response to a distributional element in a quasi-public spending program is less elastic
than the response to taxation, then deadweight loss is lower, even for the same marginal tax rates.
266. This is true even though much of the cash flows actually run through the government in the
form of loans. But even with income-driven repayment, the loans are still used to pay the price of a
good. Furthermore, under budget rules, loans are not considered government outlays. Only the present
value of the expected cost of defaults (or expected gain from interest paid) count as budget items. See
supra note 164 and accompanying text.
267. See infra Part IV.C.1.
268. Anecdotally, I have found that students are aware of the marriage penalty under IBR and PAYE,
and the advantages to filing taxes as married filing separately because combining income with a spouse
could push a borrower out of partial financial hardship. See Jason Delisle & Alexander Holt, Beware
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There is a tension to underscore here. The efficiency argument depends in
part on individuals seeing their loan payments as loan payments for tuition,
even if income-driven ones, rather than taxes. But if the program becomes more
redistributive, it could divorce the payment for the good from the value of its
benefit, which could cause a shift toward seeing the loan payment as a tax
payment, with all the associated distortions. In section IV.A.2, I pointed out that
the current PAYE program is not especially redistributive at the top end. If,
however, PAYE were reformed by removing the annual and lifetime caps, it
would effectively become a true graduate tax, and much of this efficiency
argument would become moot. This is perhaps an additional reason for relying
more heavily on general revenue to fund the subsidies, compared to graduates.
B. EXAMPLES OF OTHER INCOME-DRIVEN MODELS
Before turning to potential improvements to the PAYE program, it is helpful
to look at three examples of other income-driven repayment models that operate
similarly to PAYE: the Yale University Tuition Postponement Option from the
1970s, Australia’s current Higher Education Loan Program (HELP), and a
recent proposed pilot program in Oregon, known as “Pay it Forward.”
1. Yale University Tuition Postponement Option
The framing of income-driven repayment as collective payment for college
may seem novel to some readers, especially for a country like the United States.
But we have seen this before, at least privately, with the Yale University Tuition
Postponement Option (TPO) plan, in effect 1971–1978. The plan was designed
in part by Nobel Prize-winning economist James Tobin.269 The voluntary TPO
plan had Yale students pay, in lieu of upfront tuition, 0.4% of future earnings for
each $1000 borrowed, for thirty-five years or until the participating cohort of
the class paid off its debt, whichever came first.270 The net effect was for a
subset of each class to pay for tuition collectively, and for the higher earning
graduates to subsidize the lower earning graduates.
TPO was considered a failure, however, due to a combination of design
problems and external forces. First, the program did not manage moral hazard
well, and as a result 15%–20% of enrollees defaulted.271 The program was only
offered for a few class years, and by the time payments were finally cancelled
completely in 1999, no class had yet paid off its debt, due to the high number of
Savvy Borrowers Using Income-Based Repayment, EDCENTRAL (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.edcentral.org/
beware-savvy-borrowers-using-income-based-repayment. It is still too early to know if this is having a
broader effect on tax filing status, however.
269. See William E. Curran, Yale’s Tuition Postponement Option, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 283, 285 (1973);
Yale to Erase Alumni Debts in 2 Loan Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/
04/13/nyregion/yale-to-erase-alumni-debts-in-2-loan-plans.html.
270. See Curran, supra note 269, at 286–87; see also Note, A Tax Shelter for Students: Yale’s Tuition
Postponement Option, 81 YALE L.J. 1392, 1396–98 (1972) (discussing the program generally).
271. See Yale to Erase Alumni Debts in 2 Loan Plans, supra note 269.
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defaults.272 Second, the program did not manage adverse selection well. There
were likely too few high-income enrollees because students could choose
between TPO and a conventional tuition payment or loan plan, and the students
in TPO could later buy themselves out for 150% of the original principal.273
Thus, students who anticipated higher income would likely have chosen a
conventional plan, in which they would pay less, or otherwise left the program
early. Third, the increased availability of federal subsidized loans after 1972
undercut the appeal of TPO and likely exacerbated the adverse selection prob-
lem. These problems underscore the importance of managing moral hazard and
adverse selection well.
A final problem with the Yale program was buy-in and political support by
the high-income graduates. What looked like a good choice ex ante to insure
against the risk of low income did not look so good ex post to those who ended
up with high income. The high earners paying 2%–4% of their income for
thirty-five years ended up paying substantially more than they would have if
they had just paid tuition up front or with a traditional loan. Ex ante most
probably understood that possibility as the trade-off for potentially paying little
if they had low incomes, but ex post it looked to the high earners like simply a
bad deal. It was chiefly their complaints to Yale that caused the university to end
the program in 1999—less than thirty-five years after it started—and cancel any
remaining debt of the TPO participants.274 Thus, there may be a roll for caps or
prepayment to limit the upside risk so as to ensure continued support from
participants. If future Bill Gateses and Mark Zuckerbergs275 had to pay 10% of
their annual income, it could undermine political support.
2. Australia’s Higher Education Loan Program
Since 1989, any Australian citizen can borrow money from the government to
pay tuition costs at Australian (and in some cases overseas) universities.276
There are currently limits on the borrowing amount for some loans, though the
Australian government has announced that the loan limits will cease starting in
2016.277 The loans have a nominal interest rate equal to inflation.278 Borrowers
pay back the loans over their lifetime as a function of income. No payment is
272. See id.
273. See Bret Ladine, ’70s Debt Program Finally Ending, YALE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2001),
http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2001/03/27/70s-debt-program-finally-ending.
274. See Yale to Erase Alumni Debts in 2 Loan Plans, supra note 269 (“‘We received, over the
course of the last year or so, complaints from borrowers who were paying for a longer period of time,’
said [Yale spokesman, Lawrence J. Hass]. ‘We took these complaints seriously.’”).
275. Yes, they both went to Harvard and neither graduated. But still.
276. The system is actually a mix of several different programs that apply to, respectively, Common-
wealth-supported students (those paying partially subsidized tuition), fee-paying students (those paying
full tuition), vocational students, and overseas students. To keep the discussion brief, I focus on the key
features shared by all the programs.
277. For 2015 FEE-HELP loans (those for full-paying students), students in medicine, dentistry, or
veterinary science could borrow up to $122,162 AUD; other students could borrow up to $97,728 AUD.
FEE-HELP, STUDY ASSIST, http://studyassist.gov.au/sites/studyassist/helppayingmyfees/fee-help/pages/
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due on income under a certain amount, and for incomes above that, borrowers
pay back the loan at graduated rates, going from 4% to 8% of income, rising in
half-percentage increments.279 Thus, the repayment schedule resembles an in-
come tax with graduated rates, though importantly these rates are not marginal;
the relevant rate applies to all income, not just the income above the threshold.
Payments are calculated by and paid through the tax system and included as
part of an individual’s overall tax assessment. The payments continue until the
borrowed amount, plus accrued interest, is paid back or until the borrower dies.
Any debts outstanding are cancelled at death.
A significant difference between HELP and PAYE is that there is much less
cross-subsidization and forgiveness with HELP. Under HELP, each borrower’s
account is essentially separate, and each continues to pay it down for the
borrower’s whole life. Because of that (and collection through the tax system),
default rates are low,280 though Australia too is dealing with rising costs and
expanding debt, such that default rates may be increasing.281 The lifetime
repayment in HELP is in contrast to PAYE, which has substantial forgiveness at
a much earlier point—a maximum of twenty years after borrowing.282
There is still some cross-subsidization under HELP, however, because of the
combination of low interest and graduated repayment rates. Because the loan
principal grows only at the rate of inflation, there is a real time-value benefit to
deferring payments as long as possible, something that low-income people are
relatively more able to do than high-income people, due to the graduated
repayment rate schedule. The deferral benefit would also exist under a flat-rate
system, like PAYE, because payments would still be a function of income. But
the relative distribution of the benefit of low interest is skewed more toward
fee-help- (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). On removal of the FEE-HELP limit, see Students, DEP’T OF EDUC.
& TRAINING, http://education.gov.au/students-2 (last modified May 13, 2015).
278. 2.1% for 2015. Between 2010 and 2015, the indexation rate ranged between 1.9% and 3.0%.
See HELP and Financial Supplement Indexation Rates, AUSTL. TAX OFF., https://www.ato.gov.au/rates/
help-and-financial-supplement-indexation-rates (last modified May 29, 2015).
279. For 2015–2016, payment starts at 4% of income for incomes at or above $54,126 AUD; those
with incomes at or above $100,520 AUD pay 8% of income. See Loan Repayment, STUDY ASSIST,
http://studyassist.gov.au/sites/studyassist/payingbackmyloan/loan-repayment/pages/loan-repayment (last
visited Sept. 18, 2015). Prior to 2015, the threshold at which payments began was calculated based on
the average annual income in Australia. The government recently announced changes to the repayment
schedule, however, including making the repayment threshold closer to 90% of the average income, or
around $50,638 AUD. See Daniel Hurst, Budget: University Students to Pay More with Removal of
Caps on Fees, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 6:50 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/
budget-university-students-to-pay-more-with-removal-of-caps-on-fees.
280. JOHNSTONE & MARCUCCI, supra note 190, at 180.
281. One recent study estimates that as much as 24% of currently outstanding HELP debt in 2012
will not be repaid. ANDREW NORTON, GRATTAN INST., MAPPING AUSTRALIAN HIGHER EDUCATION 43 (2013),
available at http://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/184_2013_mapping_higher_education.
pdf. By contrast, the Australian government estimates that 17% of the debt issued 2011–2012 will not
be repaid. Id. A good portion of these defaults are because the borrowers move overseas, id., which
would be less of a problem for the U.S.’s citizenship-based tax system.
282. Or 25 years under REPAYE if the borrower has graduate school debt. See supra note 134.
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low-income borrowers by using graduated repayment rates. Moreover, the
Australian government is losing money on the deal by not charging market
interest rates, or even its own borrowing rate—that is a subsidy from taxpayers
generally, which is thus funded largely by higher-earning taxpayers.
Another important difference is the cap on borrowing. Until 2016, some
HELP loans have a lifetime borrowing cap, though the cap may be lifted for
loans after 2016.283 Although there are caps on PAYE loans for undergraduate
students, there effectively is none for graduate students.284 One concern about
PAYE is that it may lead to increases in net tuition by either raising list prices or
lowering grants, especially at law schools and other graduate schools, because
students may become less price-sensitive.
By most accounts, HELP has been a success: it has operated for almost
twenty-five years without creating significant budgetary problems. During the
recent low-inflation years, however, there was some concern that Australia
could not afford to charge interest only at the rate of inflation, particularly as
higher-education costs grow. The Australian government originally proposed
raising the interest rate, along with lowering the threshold for repayment, to
make the program more sustainable285 but has withdrawn the proposal to raise
the interest rate.
3. Oregon’s Pay It Forward Proposal
In July 2013, the Oregon state legislature passed, and the governor signed, a
bill that would authorize a pilot program, colloquially known as “Pay It
Forward” (PIF).286 The bill, based on a proposal by the Seattle-based Economic
Opportunity Institute,287 would have students at Oregon state colleges and
universities forgo paying tuition and instead contractually promise to pay a set
percentage of future income for a set number of years. The Oregon bill itself
does not set out precise figures, though the Economic Opportunity Institute
estimates that paying something like 1% of income per university year (that is,
4% of income for a standard four-year program) for twenty-five years would be
sufficient to cover expenses.288 As of this writing, Oregon has not created any
pilot program, and therefore no students are actually participating. Similar bills
have been brought up in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico,
283. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 200–05.
285. See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., BUDGET: HIGHER EDUCATION 2014–15, at 7 (2014), available at
http://budget.gov.au/2014-15/content/glossy/education/download/Budget_Glossy_education_web.pdf.
286. H.R. 3472, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
287. See AUDREY PEEK & JOHN R. BURBANK, ECON. OPPORTUNITY INST., PAY IT FORWARD: REFINANCING
HIGHER EDUCATION TO RESTORE THE AMERICAN DREAM (2012).
288. Id.; see PAY IT FORWARD WORKGROUP, HOUSE BILL 3472: PAY IT FORWARD 8, 15 (2014), available
at http://library.state.or.us/repository/2014/201410231424054/ (also finding a 4% rate for a typical
university program, as well as financial self-sufficiency after twenty-three years).
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New Jersey, and Washington.289 Legislators in New York and Pennsylvania
have said that they would propose similar bills for their states.290
PIF has earned both praise and criticism among commentators, mostly along
the lines set out in this Article.291 On the one hand, it may provide more
affordable college for more people, and in particular it socializes the provision
of education for students who might enter low-wage, but high positive-
externality fields, like teaching, nursing, or social work.292 But on the other
hand, it risks being unaffordable, particularly because it may lead to excessive
adverse selection and moral hazard.293
Although details are few, PIF seems to most closely resemble the Yale TPO
plan, rather than PAYE or HELP. Like TPO, PIF would require payment for a
fixed number of years, regardless of the total paid, whereas PAYE and HELP
stop payments after principal and interest are repaid. Similarly, the payment rate
is flat, rather than graduated as in HELP or effectively regressive as in PAYE.
Thus, commentators who worry about TPO-type problems with PIF—adverse
selection and moral hazard—may be right to be concerned. That said, the
situation is quite different from the 1970s, when TPO was available. First,
adverse selection is likely less of a problem because the huge rise in tuition
costs and the inability of student debt to be discharged in bankruptcy means that
there are fewer low-risk students. In other words, even a person who expects to
make a high income might also recognize that downside risk is quite large and
thus happily enroll in an insurance-like program such as PIF.
Second, because the program would be administered by the state, which has
taxation powers, default ought to be less likely than under the Yale plan, thus
limiting potential moral hazard problems. If Oregon chooses, it could even
collect PIF payments directly through its tax system, as in Australia, which
would effectively wipe out in-state defaults—though out-migration will remain
a problem. The moral hazard of students going into low-paying jobs may, as
discussed below, not be a big risk.294 And the moral hazard of schools raising
tuition is likely constrained by the program being for only state public universi-
289. ECON. OPPORTUNITY INST., PAY IT FORWARD: AN UPDATE ON NATIONAL PROGRESS (2014), available
at http://www.eoionline.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/Update-on-national-progress1.pdf.
290. See Steven Dubois, Plan Would Make Tuition Free at Ore. Colleges, YAHOO! (July 4, 2013, 4:10
AM), http://news.yahoo.com/plan-tuition-free-ore-colleges-225956705.html. Other states interested in-
clude Wisconsin and Ohio. See Julia Lawrence, First Oregon, Now Ohio Looking at ‘Pay It Forward’
Tuition Plan, EDUC. NEWS (July 22, 2013), http://www.educationnews.org/higher-education/first-oregon-
now-ohio-looking-at-pay-it-forward-tuition-plan.
291. For a political-economic analysis of PIF-type plans, see Jennifer A. Delaney & Dhammika
Dharmapala, “Pay It Forward” and Higher Education Subsidies: A Theoretical Model (Jan. 11, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract2518248.
292. See, e.g., Bill Lyne, The Perfect and the Good, UNITED FAC. WASH. ST. BLOG (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://www.ufws.org/2013/10/16/the-perfect-and-the-good.
293. See, e.g., Zac Bissonnette, Oregon Tuition Plan Punishes Graduates’ Success, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(July 12, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-07-12/oregon-tuition-plan-
punishes-graduates-success.
294. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.a.
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ties, which face political obstacles to raising tuition (as compared to private
nonprofit universities).
C. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The discussion thus far, including the comparisons of PAYE to Yale’s TPO,
Australia’s HELP, and Oregon’s proposed PIF plan, suggests several possible
reforms to address the programmatic, equity, and efficiency issues raised in Part
IV.A. This is not an exhaustive list. For example, I would also advocate that
income from the discharge of student loan debt be excluded from gross income
for tax purposes.295 However, these are the proposals that follow most directly
from the analytic framework in this Article—namely viewing income-driven
repayment as, in essence, a tax program—and their novelty underscores the
value of that framework.
1. Raise the Student Loan Interest Rate
The Obama administration’s primary proposal to increase progressivity of the
program is to “[e]liminat[e] the standard payment cap under PAYE so that
high-income, high-balance borrowers pay an equitable share of their earnings as
their income rises.”296 In other words, borrowers would pay 10% of discretion-
ary income all the way up the income distribution and would not default back to
the ten-year loan payment once income is high enough. That appears reasonable
on its face, and would address the odd shape of the payment schedule shown in
Figure 1. The recently adopted REPAYE plan incorporates this change.297
The problem is that, under the current rules, the result would be to accelerate
the rate at which a high-income borrower pays off a loan, rather than increase
the total amount paid. If a PAYE borrower pays only until the total payments
equal principal and accrued interest, then increasing the monthly payments just
means paying off the debt more rapidly. That could also mean less revenue for
the government in present-value terms, if it is charging a spread above its
borrowing cost. This could in turn lead to less subsidization by high-income
graduates and more from general revenues—not necessarily ideal. This is in
contrast to Australia’s HELP program, in which accelerating payments de-
creases the subsidy to high-income graduates because the subsidy is largely due
to a low interest rate.298 This is a major oversight in the new REPAYE program.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 143–50.
296. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 135; see also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 165, at R-13.
The other proposals focus more on cost management and limiting incentives for schools to increase
tuition. The New America Foundation made a similar proposal. See JASON DELISLE & ALEX HOLT, NEW
AM. FOUND., SAFETY NET OR WINDFALL?: EXAMINING CHANGES TO INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT FOR FEDERAL
STUDENT LOANS 14 (2012), available at https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2332-safety-net-or-
windfall/NAF_Income_Based_Repayment.18c8a688f03c4c628b6063755ff5dbaa.pdf.
297. See REPAYE Rules, supra note 134, at 67,213–14.
298. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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Offsetting that cost would be a decrease in the amount of forgiveness after
twenty years. Suppose someone had low income for the first ten years and thus
accrued a substantial unpaid balance. If that person had a high income for the
next ten years, and thus paid what would have been the original ten-year loan
payment, it is possible that there would still be an unpaid balance after ten
years. If instead, the payments during the last ten years were a function of
income, and thus higher than the standard ten-year loan payment, there would
be less to forgive at the end of twenty years. It is difficult to know the
distributional impact of these two effects together given our limited experience,
but it is at least not certain that removing the annual payment cap would lead to
more progressivity in all cases.
Therefore, to ensure that changes like removing the annual payment cap or
even introducing graduated rates, such as in Australia’s HELP program, increase
progressivity and redistribution, the lifetime cap would also have to be lifted or
removed so that high-income graduates would pay more than the present value
of their tuition. For example, the government could require all borrowers to pay
a percentage of discretionary income at flat or graduated rates for at least fifteen
years, even if a traditional loan would have been paid off sooner.299 This would
be similar to the design of Yale’s TPO and Oregon’s PIF programs.
But this would introduce a number of problems. First, and most obvious, is
the political risk to the program if high-income graduates start to see it as unfair.
This is part of what led to the demise of Yale’s program. Second, as already
noted, there is value in keeping the payments tied to the benefit of the good
itself.300 If the payments become decoupled from benefit and become merely a
function of income, then they truly become income taxes, with all the distor-
tions and politics that go along with that. Third, lifting the lifetime cap could
remove what little market check there is on tuitions. Right now, the nominal
tuition amount still affects the total amount paid. Even if payments were only a
function of income, students would still have a reason to care about the school’s
list price. If the lifetime cap were changed or removed, however, that final
reason would disappear, leaving schools either free to raise tuition as much as
they would like or, alternatively, subject to stiffer government price regulation.
A more immediate and practical way to increase progressivity would be to
raise the statutory student loan interest rate. In 2013, the interest rate on
unsubsidized federal loans was 6.8%, and the rate for subsidized loans had
recently changed from 3.4% to 6.8%. These high rates were controversial, given
high debt loads and tuitions. The charge was that the government was profiting
299. This would also require either disallowing prepayment or adding a prepayment penalty.
Currently, full prepayment is allowed without penalty. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(3)(ii) (2015). The
prepayment would ideally be targeted to the present value of the expected spread the government was
to earn on future interest. But a rough measure, such as the 150% prepayment allowed under the Yale
TPO plan, might be appropriate. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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from the need of students who could not afford to pay up front.301 Congress
responded by passing the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013,302
which fixed the interest rate for undergraduate loans at the ten-year Treasury
note rate plus 2.05% (capped at 8.25%), and the rate for graduate loans at the
ten-year Treasury note rate plus 3.6% (capped at 9.5%).303 For 2015–2016, that
meant rates of 4.29% and 5.84% for undergraduate and graduate Direct Loans,
respectively (and 6.84% for Graduate PLUS loans).304
This change was misguided, in my view. If income-driven repayment is
widely adopted, then the only people who would actually pay a high rate like
6.8% are those with relatively high income; all others pay just 10% of discretion-
ary income with limited interest accrual and capitalization, and possible forgive-
ness, and so should be largely indifferent to the statutory interest rate. Thus,
lowering the statutory rate for undergraduates may actually have made the
overall PAYE system less progressive and put a greater burden on general
revenues. Increasing the rate would put more of the overall cost of the program
on high-income graduates without the risk of entirely decoupling the payments
from the underlying tuition.305
2. Increase Borrowing Limits by Shifting Funding from Pell Grants
Commentators’ main criticisms of the current IBR and PAYE programs are
that they are both expensive and potentially regressive because they provide the
most benefit for graduates of professional schools, such as law and medicine.306
There is some truth to the regressivity point, but this is an artifact of, first,
higher tuition for professional and graduate school, and second, the cap on
PAYE-eligible loans for undergraduates, but not for graduate students.
High tuitions for law and medicine, among other schools, are likely justified
because of the high earnings premiums available to individuals with those
301. See, e.g., Tim Dickinson, The Student Loan Crusader: How Elizabeth Warren Wants to Reduce
Debt, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-student-loan-
crusader-how-elizabeth-warren-wants-to-reduce-debt-20140820.
302. Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127 Stat. 506.
303. Id. § 2(a)(3), 127 Stat. at 506–07.
304. Annual Notice of Interest Rates of Federal Student Loans Made Under the William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program on or After July 1, 2013, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,488, 42,489 (2015).
305. This could result in private lenders cherry-picking low-risk borrowers. See, e.g., Jordan
Weissmann, A Sign That Washington Might Be Charging Grad Students Too Much Interest on Their
Student Loans, SLATE (June 12, 2015, 4:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/06/12/
student_loan_refinancing_it_might_be_about_to_cost_the_government_a_lot.html. Grad students are a
somewhat special case, however, because their interest rate on federal Grad PLUS loans is higher and
their risk is lower. But the government should still be able to charge somewhat more than private
lenders, given the insurance benefit of potential lower payments and forgiveness for those with low
income. See infra note 324.
306. See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, supra note 296, at 10; see also AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 179, at
2, 8 (arguing that benefits accrue disproportionately to students with expensive B.A. degrees, though
the authors ignore graduate school).
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degrees.307 But the high tuition also increases the magnitude of downside risk
for graduates who do not end up earning a high salary; thus, somewhat greater
downside protection through income-driven repayment may be reasonable.
Furthermore, in many cases, much of the tuition revenue generated by a
professional school goes to subsidize other areas of a university; thus, it is not
quite right to say that the graduate student is the sole beneficiary of forgiveness.
Nonetheless, a full accounting of the reasons for different tuition levels is
beyond the scope of this Article.
But the other way to increase the relative benefit to undergraduates would be
to increase the loan limits. Currently, a dependent student can borrow only a
total of $31,000 in PAYE-eligible loans for an undergraduate degree and only
$27,000 for the first four years, whereas a graduate student can borrow up to the
full cost of attendance, including some living expenses.308 As noted earlier, the
limitation may not be a large hindrance to undergraduate attendance because of
the availability of Pell Grants and institutional aid, but it may still be the wrong
allocation of resources. For example, private student loans are a growing share
of new debt, likely reflecting a need beyond existing financial aid and federal
loans.309
In its most recent budget, the Obama administration estimates the cost of an
expanded income-driven loan repayment program at somewhere between $1
billion and $3 billion per year.310 At the same time, the administration has
requested an appropriation of $28.9 billion for Pell Grants for the 2016 fiscal
year. Because these amounts are with respect to the same student cohort for the
same year of college, there is roughly a ten-to-one focus on students with
low-income parents versus students who might earn low incomes after gradua-
tion. As argued above, I believe this to be both poor targeting of public funds
and inequitable. Even if need-based grants should continue to play a role—even
the majority role—due to behavioral effects,311 it is unlikely that they need to
swamp income-driven repayment to this degree.
Raising the loan limits will likely increase their budgetary costs because
higher debt levels would likely lead to more forgiveness. But even if the costs
doubled, they would still be less than the cost of Pell Grants. However, if
expanding the PAYE program requires a pay-for, Congress should consider
shrinking the Pell Grant program. This is, of course, a somewhat counterintui-
tive proposal, particularly when part of the policy reason to nationalize student
lending in the first place was to free up revenue to expand the Pell Grant
307. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 249, 284 (2014).
308. On the aggregate borrowing limits, see supra text accompanying notes 200–05.
309. See supra note 125.
310. See supra Part III.B. Recall that the loan cost estimate reflects the present value of the
difference between total loan outlays and receipts over the life of the loan.
311. See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
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program.312 But it follows straightforwardly from the analysis in Part IV.A: the
overall shift would be both revenue-neutral and, in my view, more effective and
equitable.313
3. Require a Discount on PAYE-Funded Tuition
Two of the biggest concerns with income-driven repayment are, first, that
schools could raise tuition indefinitely because students would not bear much of
the risk of the higher payments; and, second, that students who can pay out of
pocket would opt out, particularly if the payment caps were lifted. These are, in
essence, the classic moral hazard and adverse selection problems in any risk-
sharing program. I address them each in detail, and then offer a solution to both:
discounting PAYE-funded tuition.
a. Moral Hazard. There are essentially three possible avenues for moral
hazard from income-driven repayment. First, graduates may simply default.
Second, graduates may change their behavior to avoid high payments, such as
by working less or for less income. Third, students may purchase “too much”
education, especially if prices go up. The first was a significant problem for the
Yale TPO program but is less of a risk for the PAYE program because it brings
with it the weight of federal enforcement. Only by leaving the country could
one simply not pay.314 Furthermore, it appears that the twenty-year forgiveness
is tolled during any period during which the loans are in default.315
Second, the risk that graduates have an incentive to earn less income has
already been addressed.316 The risk here seems contained and manageable.
Furthermore, the risk is likely no greater than the risk created by the income tax
system itself, and may be less if the program maintains the quasi-public
spending elements discussed in section IV.A.3.
Thus, the largest moral hazard is likely to be an excess of spending on
education, either because students simply buy too much or schools accelerate
their tuition increases. If the increased costs simply lead to more forgiveness,
then students may become indifferent to costs, which could in turn erase any
market check on prices.317 This is a real concern.318 For-profit schools have
312. See METTLER, supra note 122, at 69–70.
313. There is some risk that high loan limits could drive up tuition because there is more money
made available for schools. See supra note 50 (discussing the revenue theory of costs). I discuss a way
to limit this risk in the next section. Note, however, that Pell Grants would have similar theoretical
effects, and so substituting student loans for Pell Grants should not have any first-order effect on
tuitions.
314. This is the significant source of defaults for Australia’s HELP program. See supra note 281.
Emigration of skilled workers is not generally believed to be a problem for the U.S. compared with,
say, Europe. See, e.g., Poutvaara, supra note 190, at 664–65 (discussing how Sweden abandoned its
income-contingent loan program in part because of the pressures of labor mobility).
315. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(6)(iv) (2015).
316. See supra Part IV.A.1.
317. To be clear, students do continue to bear some risk under current rules. First, the nominal
tuition amount sets the borrower’s lifetime cap amount, and thus the higher tuition is, the longer a
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already been criticized for exactly this problem under the pre-existing student
loan regime.319 It appears that Yale instituted the TPO plan in part to finance
desired tuition increases.320 And this writer’s employer has been accused (un-
fairly) of similar behavior with respect to the IBR program.321 Left unchecked,
such behavior would undermine the goals of the program and could ultimately
bankrupt it.
b. Adverse Selection. Under our current system, in which a student borrower
can choose to enroll in PAYE or stay in the typical ten-year repayment plan,
there is little incentive not to enroll; that it can be no worse than the ten-year
plan ensures that any well-informed student should enroll in PAYE, even those
who could afford to pay out of pocket.322 Thus, as currently designed, there
really is no adverse selection problem.
But if the program is changed to increase redistribution, the system may
become less attractive to low-risk borrowers. Enhancing the redistribution in the
system would mean charging high-income graduates more than the present
value of their tuition. If a student is confident about high future income (perhaps
because she is majoring in computer science323 or the like), then that student
may not want to take on the risk of overpaying later. This could then leave the
pool of borrowers with more overall risk of low income, thus requiring more
student will be paying into the program. Unless the student were already expecting forgiveness, tuition
hikes would cost the student. Second, the forgiveness remains, as of this writing, taxable income from
the discharge of indebtedness. Thus, students are only partly insured against excessive payments.
318. Others have noted this risk as well. See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, supra note 296, at 12; Schrag,
supra note 158, at 418–19; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Problems with Income Based Repayment, and the
Charge of Elitism: Responses to Schrag and Chambliss, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 534 (2013).
319. See U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., FOR PROFIT HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 24–34
(Comm. Print 2012); Tamar Lewin, Senate Committee Report on For-Profit Colleges Condemns Costs
and Practices, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/education/harkin-report-
condemns-for-profit-colleges.html.
320. See, e.g., John Geesman, New Dean, Tuition Plan to Be Announced Today, YALE DAILY NEWS
(Feb. 5, 1971), at 1 (connecting tuition increase with TPO); Albert W. Buesking, Introduction to YALE
UNIVERSITY TUITION POSTPONEMENT OFFICE, THE YALE TUITION POSTPONEMENT SEMINAR 4 (1972), available
at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED067012.pdf (“Then the problem became, how do you finance
increases in tuition? Because obviously we felt those increases would come. Our costs were still rising
at a rate that we could not accept without passing at least a portion of it along to the students through
tuition. So in the summer of 1970 we undertook a university-wide study to develop a plan that we could
make operational the following year.”).
321. See, e.g., Georgetown Law Is Giving Away a Free Education, and You’re Paying for It, NEW
AM. (Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/georgetown-law-is-giving-away-a-
free-education-and-youre-paying-for-it. For a response, see William M. Treanor, Georgetown Law’s
Loan Policy Is Good for Society as Well as Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://chronicle.com/article/Georgetown-Laws-Loan-Policy/141215.
322. The combination of relatively low interest plus the ability to lower payments and interest
capitalization for those with low income should be attractive to just about anyone, even someone from a
family with enough liquid assets or income to pay directly.
323. See NAT’L ASS’N COLLS. & EMP’RS, SALARY SURVEY: APRIL 2012 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2012)
(reporting that computer engineering majors have the highest median starting salary at $67,800 in
2012).
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subsidization from general revenues. Furthermore, students from wealthier
families may just choose to opt out, with negative distributional consequences.324
That said, it is not clear how large this risk is. At current tuition levels and
rates of growth, the downside risk for a traditional student borrower (or
out-of-pocket payer) is quite large. Student loan payments on traditional loans
can easily get into the thousands of dollars per month, an amount that would be
crippling for many people. Furthermore, changes in the labor market mean that
job security is not as high as in previous periods. In our current economic
climate, almost anyone can face the possibility of a substantial period of
unemployment or underemployment. Moreover, student loans cannot in most
cases be discharged in bankruptcy.325 Finally, it may not be enough to simply
expect future high income if the person is liquidity constrained at the time of
enrollment. If PAYE is the only type of student loan, then it may only be those
with wealthy families who opt out, though they still bear some risk through
lower savings.326 Therefore, it may be that there are relatively few students who
would rationally refuse the PAYE deal, even if it meant that they might overpay
in the future.
That said, solutions are still needed. Two potential, but unsatisfying, solutions
are mandates and additional subsidies. Mandates raise liberty concerns and are
politically difficult. It is hard to imagine banning out-of-pocket payments
because that would be essentially equivalent to instituting a graduate tax.327
And subsidies that would be large enough to induce even those with family
wealth to use PAYE-eligible debt would complicate the delicate balance of
programmatic and distributional spending discussed above. The next section
details a perhaps better solution.
c. Discount PAYE-Funded Tuition. The federal government should consider
requiring schools to provide a discount on tuition to those paying tuition with
PAYE-eligible debt—essentially mandating institutional aid in addition to the
loan.328 This would address both moral hazard concerns about school tuition
hikes, and also the adverse selection and distributional concerns of wealthy
families paying out of pocket.
The rule would help to contain tuition price hikes by simply providing a
discount and by requiring the schools to have some “skin in the game” by
324. An additional possibility is private entrants into the market cherry-picking the lowest risks.
There is some evidence of this happening under our current loan rules. See, e.g., COMMONBOND,
http://commonbond.co (last visited Oct. 10, 2015); SOFI, http://www.sofi.com (last visited Oct. 10,
2015). Although this strategy is possible for traditional loans, it is unlikely that a private lender could
provide the sort of income insurance that PAYE provides, given the large commitment and potentially
the need to spread risk across generations (much as the tax system does).
325. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
326. Assuming that potential loan competitors do not offer a better deal. See supra note 324.
327. See supra note 190.
328. The discount would be prorated for those paying with a combination of PAYE-eligible debt and
cash (or other debt).
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paying some of the expected cost of future forgiveness. That is, by lowering the
amount of debt a student is required to take on, there would likely be somewhat
less forgiveness after twenty years. That expected cost would instead be borne
by the schools through the tuition discount. And the schools would be some-
what restrained from simply raising list-price tuition because full-payers would
provide a market check on tuition growth.
A more complex rule could include a variable discount that depended on the
rate of default on loans to students attending that school. Thus, schools would
bear some of the cost of their students’ defaults.329 An additional feature could
be to apply the discount against an average discounted tuition or another
measure that took account of what paying students actually paid out of pocket,
not just the list-price tuition. These two features could provide a powerful
constraint on school tuition pricing without implementing more active price
regulation.
The rule would also potentially help with the opt-out problem by first making
opting out of taking debt somewhat less attractive because the price would go
up, and, second, by ensuring that those who opt out are still helping to support
the system. If PAYE is made more progressive by, for example, raising the
interest rate, that means that high-income borrowers disproportionately support
the program. But it would be unfortunate from an equity standpoint if the
richest students of all pay less by opting out of PAYE entirely and just paying
cash. Requiring a higher payment from them can correct that problem.330 This
is, in a sense, just a particular application of the logic that underlies discounted
tuition and institutional grants in the first place—some moderate redistribution
from those with the ability to pay up front to those without that ability.331
D. PRIVATE DEBT AND CREDIT RATINGS
Although I argue here that PAYE is better thought of as a tax-and-transfer
program than a loan program, the loan-like structure means that former students
have nominal debt on their personal balance sheets. Thus, a key criticism of
PAYE is that it could encourage students to take on more debt, and that even
with generous repayment terms, that debt could still prove costly to students,
329. This would be similar in spirit to the recent Gainful Employment (GE) rules for for-profit
schools promulgated by the Obama Administration. GE rules look at a for-profit institution’s ratio of
typical student debt to typical postgraduation earnings as a condition for continued receipt of funds
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 79 Fed. Reg.
64,890, 64,891 (July 1, 2014) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 600, 668).
330. Additional rules would likely be needed to ensure that individuals do not simply take out loans
just to get the discounted tuition and then immediately pay off the debt. For example, the discount
could be applied on a month-to-month basis, taken out of the loan payment, so that it only applied as
long as the debt was outstanding.
331. The risk of this proposal is that it will increase the already high incentives for colleges to prefer
full-paying students in the admissions process. If that occurs, it could undermine any access benefits
that PAYE provides. This is an additional argument for keeping direct grants, like Pell Grants, in the
financial aid mix.
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such as by lowering their credit scores, making it difficult to take on other debt,
or just being a source of financial insecurity.332 Because this issue is central to
policy concerns regarding student debt, I address it separately here.
Excessive household debt is certainly dangerous for both individuals and the
economy as a whole. As Atif Mian and Amir Sufi have shown, excessive
household debt has been a feature of some of the worst financial crises and
recessions, especially the Great Recession following the 2008 financial crisis.333
Thus, we must be sensitive to policies that encourage even more household
debt.
That said, the primary problems of household debt should not appear with
PAYE. With some simplification, the individual and systemic risks of household
debt take two key forms: First, excessive leverage with respect to assets risks
wiping out any equity if asset prices drop, which can further contaminate asset
prices through fire sales and the like.334 And second, debt service payments can
become debilitating if income drops. Neither risk presents itself with PAYE.335
The first risk is essentially what happened in the housing crisis 2007–2008,
when many homeowners ended up underwater on their mortgages.336 But this
sort of destruction of equity cannot happen with respect to PAYE because there
is no asset securitizing the loan. Or rather, the asset connected with the loan is
the borrower’s human capital, which no other person can have an ownership
stake in.337 If a recession causes the “value” of that human capital to drop (for
example, because wages have dropped), that does not change the relative
ownership of that asset, unlike with housing or other leveraged assets. Of
course, other assets may be affected, for example, because the government
could have a claim on the borrower’s other assets in bankruptcy. But this then
leads to the second risk of excessive debt—the risk of debilitating service
payments.
332. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 109–12 (2012); ASHER ET AL., supra note
138, at 12–14.
333. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT 4–9 (2014).
334. See id. at 19–30.
335. Note that the income-based structure of IBR is similar to Mian and Sufi’s proposal for
“shared-responsibility mortgages,” which would allow for lower mortgage payments if home prices
fall. See id. at 171–74.
336. If a house is leveraged 80% or more, then a price drop can wipe out any equity, making the
bank effectively the 100% owner of the asset. See id. at 19. That means that homeowners, especially
low-income homeowners, bear much of the risk of a price drop, whereas banks and their depositors,
shareholders, and creditors bear little. And the foreclosures that follow a bubble bursting can create
even more downward pressure on asset prices. See id. at 18–19. Between 2007 and 2008, the asset price
drop thus acted to shift relative economic resources away from low-income people and toward
higher-income savers and investors. See id. at 19–21.
337. Indeed, this is one primary answer given for why there are private credit market failures
necessitating a government role in providing student loans. Because a private lender cannot get
sufficient security in the borrower’s human capital, there is greater risk, and thus the creditor would
demand higher interest. See Avery & Turner, supra note 112, at 167 (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 113,
at 86–87).
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That risk also does not exist, precisely because of the PAYE formula. A
destitute person essentially owes the government nothing; thus, he bears little
additional pain due to the debt. Indeed (and importantly), neither would other
creditors. In bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy, because no current payments
would be owed to the government, no money would go to the government prior
to other creditors. Indeed, one of the functions of income-driven repayment is as
a substitute for discharge of student loans in bankruptcy, which is in most cases
not currently possible.338 But instead of allowing payment adjustments and
partial discharge only when insolvent, PAYE would allow a more gradual shift
in payments at many different levels of income and wealth. In this way, it
operates as a more nuanced and graduated form of discharge.
For these reasons, it also should be the case that credit rating agencies will
not penalize students for PAYE debt. Because payments shift with income,
default due only to low income is essentially impossible, and large payments are
only owed if there is a large income to pay it. Recall that the main claim in this
Article is that PAYE payments operate more like tax payments than loan
payments; to treat PAYE debt negatively would be like treating future income
tax liability as a debt overhang. Ultimately, credit rating agencies care about
debt payments as a fraction of income, and by definition PAYE payments will
never exceed 10%. Indeed, most of the factors that go into a person’s FICO
score have to do with timeliness of payments and number of debts outstanding.
Only about 30% of the score relates to amounts outstanding, and even for that,
installment loans, such as student loans, are treated more lightly than revolving
loans, like credit card debt.339
Although the PAYE payment may crowd out other potential debt payments
somewhat, the effect should be limited and contained. For example, the PAYE
payment should make up only about 7%–8% of earned income,340 but Federal
Housing Authority guidelines allow a total debt-to-income ratio of 43% for
conforming mortgage loans.341 It may be that a credit rating agency or lender
would see the overall size of the debt as a signal of financial profligacy, even if
the debt is not risky in itself. But this is not at all certain, given that the debts
are to invest in higher education, which likely makes the borrower more
creditworthy. For these reasons, the nominal size of any PAYE debt should not
have a large effect on a former student’s overall creditworthiness.
338. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
339. See Schrag, supra note 158, at 402–04 (discussing effects of IBR loans on credit ratings).
340. Recall that IBR payments are 10% of the net of AGI less 150% of the relevant poverty line,
which makes the base smaller than the income base lenders consider in evaluating potential borrowers.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
341. FHA Requirements, Debt-to-Income Ratio Guidelines, FHA, http://www.fha.com/fha_
requirements_debt (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
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CONCLUSION
The cost of higher education and the associated high levels of debt have
become in recent years issues of significant public importance. Although higher
education continues to be a good investment, it comes with risk, particularly as
a greater share of the rising costs are being placed directly on individuals. This
exposure to greater risk comes at a time when the supply of workers with
advanced skills is arguably too low to meet the demands of skill-biased techno-
logical change and social mobility is stagnating.
Given the importance of higher education to an economy and a society, one
might ask whether government should just provide higher education directly,
just as local governments do for primary and secondary education. By directly
providing higher education, a government could spread the risk and socialize
the costs in the service of solving the undersupply problem. The problem,
however, is the sheer expense of doing so because as both the cost of and
demand for higher education grows, so do other demands on public resources.
Another potential solution would be to subsidize just the students from
low-income families, rather than everyone. This describes more recent ap-
proaches to higher education, with subsidies coming from the federal govern-
ment and from the institutions themselves, both public and private. But these
subsidies are mistargeted; subsidies ought to be for those who enter low-wage
but high-positive externality jobs (and for those simply with bad luck), rather
than for those who end up entering higher-income business and professional
jobs. Furthermore, as a practical matter, Pell Grants and institutional financial
aid are often not generous enough, and the system creates complicated means-
testing issues that themselves can be a barrier to potential students.
In this Article, I claim that a series of changes to the student loan program
point a way toward a potentially superior form of public financing for higher
education—income-driven repayment. By providing tuition for all, but demand-
ing repayment only as a function of income, the government can meet the
demands both of an economy that requires more skills and of justice and
fairness in ensuring that family wealth is not a barrier to entry. And it can do so
with limited taxes and limited growth in nominal public spending. Although
PAYE will need adjustments to better serve these goals, it may also provide a
model for future large-scale government programs in an age of income inequality.
2016] 289INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT
